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Law and Legitimacy
in South Africa
Stephen Ellmann
This article examines whether anti-apartheidlawyering might have legitimized the South African legal system by asking what black South Africans
actually thought of that system. Perhaps surprisingly, blacks, and in particular Africans, appear to have accorded the legal system a measure of legitimacy despite the oppression they often suffered at its hands. Three paradigms
of African opinion are offered to help us understand the complex African
response to the legal system: the conservatives, forbearing, acutely concerned
with such issues as order and security, and perhaps disposed to be deferential
to institutions of white authority; the speakers, fueled by faith in the truth or
power of their speech, and welcoming the opportunity to be heard that courts
could provide; and the activists, adamantly determined to bring down
apartheid, and judging institutions and people by their contribution to that
goal. For men and women thinking in these ways, anti-apartheidlawyering
probably did contribute to legitimizing the legal system and that system's
ideals. But this partiallegitimation of the legal system is, in the end, no cause
for regret; instead, it may have helped the new South Africa begin building a
nation governed by law.
Throughout the last years of apartheid, liberal South African lawyers
declared that their country's legal system faced a crisis of legitimacy.' In my
Stephen Ellmann is a professor of law at New York Law School. His acknowledgments
appear at the end of the article on p. 479.

1. Thus John Dugard, a powerful South African critic of apartheid law for many years,
wrote recently that "[i]t was inevitable that blacks would lose confidence in this system of law.
Consequently, for the majority of the population, the law is not legitimate." John Dugard,
"Blacks and the Administration of Justice," in Dugard, ed., The Last Years of Apartheid: Civil
Liberties in South Africa 95, 103 (1992) ("Dugard, Last Years"). So, too, Charles Dlamini, a
prominent African legal scholar, has written: "The legitimacy crisis in South Africa has
largely stemmed from the fact that black people have not felt that the law that is applicable to
them is made by them and for them." Charles R. M. Dlamini, "Towards a New Legal Order
for a New South Africa," 16 Legal Stud. F. 131, 136 (1992). Similarly, Nico Steyder commented that "[ilt has been said [by Albie Sachs, in 1975] that the majority of South Africans
© 1995 American Bar Foundation.
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opinion they were right. Their comments reflected the disappointment and
even despair that anti-apartheid lawyers felt at many of the decisions
handed down by the South African courts and gave voice as well to the
sentiments that many victims of apartheid must have felt in response to
those same decisions. More broadly, however, the crisis of legitimacy the
legal system faced was part of the crisis of legitimacy the entire system of
apartheid faced-a crisis that now, happily, has proved to be terminal.
. Despite the crisis of legitimacy they perceived, South African lawyers
continued to challenge apartheid through the courts. For their part, antiapartheid movements in South Africa, adamant as they often were about
rejecting participation in the institutions of apartheid, did not extend this
stance to the courts. With rare exceptions, those who faced prosecution in
criminal trials did so with the assistance of counsel, likely funded not by the
state but rather, quite often, by foreign donors who thus supported the strategy of courtroom resistance to apartheid. Many others, who did not face
prosecution, chose to initiate legal action in the hope of securing redress for
some of the grievances they experienced as a result of the system of
apartheid. The lawyers who represented these clients, moreover, by no
means adopted courtroom strategies of total defiance; instead, their characteristic approach seems to have been to play within the rules, to press the
categories of South African legal argument to their limits but still to remain
within those categories. Finally, and perhaps most surprisingly, these lawyers
2
and their clients sometimes won.
Ironically, therefore, the same lawyers who most urgently asserted the
existence of a crisis of judicial legitimacy were also engaged in litigation
that invoked and sometimes demonstrated the capacity of South African
law to render just results. Some worried, however, that the result of this
work would be to legitimize the very system whose injustice they were challenging. This same concern has troubled observers of lawyering against injustice in many different countries besides South Africa, and is, of course, a
focus of this symposium. 4 One of its sources is the recognition that many
accord less legitimacy to their laws than perhaps any other governed group in modem society." N. C. Steytler, "Criminal Justice and the Apartheid State," in A. J. Rycroft, L. J. Boulle,
M. K. Robertson, & P. R. Spiller, eds., Race and the Law in South Africa 68, 68 (1987).
2. Stephen Ellmann, In a Tine of Trouble: Law and Liberty in South Africa's State of Emergency 231-47 (1992) ("Ellmann, 'time of Trouble").
3. Cf. Raymond Wacks, "Judges and Injustice," 101 S. Aft. LJ. 266 (1984).
4. Cf., e.g., Ronen Shamir, "'Landmark Cases' and the Reproduction of Legitimacy: The
Case of Israel's High Court of Justice," 24 Law & Soc'y Rev. 781 (1990); Frederick F Snyder,
"State of Siege and Rule of Law in Argentina: The Politics and Rhetoric of Vindication," 15
Lawyer of the Americas 503 (1984). "Critical" scholars and others have seen similar dangers in
domestic American legal contexts. For example, Austin Sarat sees legal or quasi-legal arguments used by members of the "welfare poor" as "reaffirm[ing] law's dominance even as they
are used to challenge the decisions of particular legal officials-or to provide the grounds for a
redress of grievances." Austin Sarat, "'. . . The Law Is All Over': Power, Resistance and the
Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor," 2 Yale J.L. & Hum. 343, 374 (1990).

Law and Legitimacy in South Africa

oppressive governments choose to enact much of their oppression through
law. Certainly this was true in South Africa, where the contours of
apartheid and the attendant draconian internal security powers that kept
apartheid in place for over 40 years were described in abundant legislation
and regulation. While apartheid also rested on illegality, up to and including torture and murder, the striking legalism of this system of injustice suggests that the whites who ruled South Africa saw the use of law as a source
of legitimation of their authority. As I have argued elsewhere, white South
Africans could invoke their adherence to legality as a basis for claiming
membership in the community of Western nations; as a testament to their
own civilization, in contrast to the barbarism they attributed to those whom
they ruled; and as a gift to the subjects of apartheid, a gift from which whites
could reap gratitude and respect.5 If South Africa sought to legitimize its
oppression through the use of law, perhaps anti-apartheid lawyers' efforts to
bend the law to better purposes were doomed to play into the hands of the
architects of apartheid.
Thus the worry.' In my book on South African law, In a Time of
Trouble: Law and Liberty in South Africa's State of Emergency, I argued that
this worry was, as a matter of fact, not well-founded. I maintained there that
litigation challenging emergency powers had contributed, modestly but still
meaningfully, to protecting both individuals and political movements from
even more effective repression than they would otherwise have faced. At
the same time, I argued that it was unlikely that either South African
whites or foreign observers had actually found much ground for asserting the
legitimacy of the system of apartheid in the various emergency cases, cases
that were notable both for the governmental abuses they highlighted and
for the grim-though not unbroken-pattern of judicial rejection of efforts
to limit those abuses. It was even more evident, as had been emphasized to
me in South Africa, that black South Africans simply had not been taken
in. On the contrary, black militancy had proved to be ineradicable-and we
know now, in 1995, that ultimately the former victims of emergency power
would sit at negotiating tables to settle the terms of the transition from
apartheid to democracy and then enter the halls of government as the new
leaders of a post-apartheid South Africa.
I also suggested, however, that it remained possible that emergency
litigation had had a more modest legitimating effect-namely, to lend a
measure of legitimacy to the legal system, as distinguished from the broader
system of apartheid as a whole. It seemed to me, however, that this was no
cause for regret. On the contrary, the possibility that anti-apartheid lawyering might have encouraged South Africans to see virtue in the ideals of
fearless advocacy, independent judging, and the rule of law offered promise
that these same ideals would be honored in a post-apartheid South Africa.
5. Ellmann, Time of Trouble 176-86.
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On this score, therefore, the possibility of legitimation was not a cost but a
further benefit of anti-apartheid lawyering-but it was, also, just a
6
possibility.
There is no occasion now to return to the question of whether the
system of apartheid could claim legitimacy among most South Africans. It
could not, and so it has now come to an end-though its grim heritage, of
course, will take decades to redress. 7 It remains worthwhile, however, to
reexamine the extent to which the efforts of anti-apartheid lawyering might
have legitimized South Africa's legal system. Answering this question, in
fact, is important for an understanding both of the workings of the old regime and of the process of shaping a more just successor-not only in South
Africa but in other countries too.
It is appropriate to begin this inquiry by specifying its scope. Though
the concept of the "legal system" is potentially a very broad one, and though
much of the empirical data on which I will rely is phrased in precisely such
broad language, my principal concern will be with the legitimacy of the
state institution in which anti-apartheid lawyers most prominently
worked-the courts. But this focus on the courts cannot be absolute, for
South Africans' views of other aspects of their country's legal institutions
rightly affect their assessment of their courts. We will not be able to consider South Africans' views of their courts without having in mind, to some
extent, their views of apartheid's laws, of the police, and of the legal profession as well.
In asking whether the legal system retained a measure of legitimacy,
and why it might have done so, I employ a concept-legitimacy-whose

6. Id. at 257-68. These arguments point to the value of the efforts anti-apartheid lawyers
had made to challenge emergency powers in the South African courts. The possibility remains, however, that some other course of conduct by lawyers would have been even more
effective. Perhaps the most plausible alternative would have been a Gandhian refusal to offer
any defense other than an appeal to pure moral principle. In my book I suggest that in South
Africa the potential reluctance of the legal community and of the victims of apartheid to
engage in such tactics, as well as the possibly hostile response of the white population to
them, would have made the success of a Gandhian approach dubious. These considerations
helped confirm the general correctness, in the circumstances, of the continued participation
in the South African legal system by lawyers and judges opposed to apartheid. Id. at 268-72.
It is my understanding now, however, that certain liberal judges and lawyers did consider, or
even threaten, organized acts of nonparticipation during the apartheid years.
7. In 1986, Lawrence Schlemmer wrote flatly: "Most blacks completely reject
apartheid." "The Sanctions Surveys: In Search of Ordinary Black Opinion," 4 (2) IndicatorSA
9, 9 (1986). Indeed, the demise of apartheid may be less the immediate result of a failure of
legitimacy than of the breakdown of the strategies of manipulation by which whites had maintained power despite "never [having] possessed power in the eyes of [their] subordinates." See
Heribert Adam, 'Engineering Compliance: The Management of Dissent in South Africa," in
John Hund, ed., Law andJusticein South Africa 173, 189 (1988) ("Adam, 'Compliance' "). See
generally David 0. Friedrichs, "Law in South Africa and the Legitimacy Crisis," 14 (2) Int'1J.
Comp. & App. Crim. Just. 1 (1990).
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meaningfulness has been cogently challenged by Alan Hyde. 8 Hyde insists
that legitimacy-defined as "the effective belief in [the] binding or obligatory quality" of a social order 9-simply cannot be shown to have any real
impact on actual compliance with or resistance to the demands issuing from
that social order. 10 More recent scholarship may have succeeded in demonstrating such actual impacts, 1 but I will not offer, nor should we expect,
evidence that such legitimacy as the South African legal system enjoyed
translated into obedience to the laws of apartheid. Such obedience would
have been evidence of legitimation of the entire social order, and that is
precisely what did not exist in South Africa as apartheid faded. Instead,
disobedience to the laws-from political violence to rent boycotts to extremely high rates of ordinary crime-was widespread in the last days of the
old regime.
But I do not mean to disavow the connection between legitimating
beliefs and law-abiding behavior. It is possible that law-breaking would have
been even more widespread in the absence of the measure of legitimacy I
will argue existed.12 It is also possible that South Africans, ready as they
were to violate many laws, were more reluctant to violate court orders, because those legal commands issued from an institution-the legal systemthat retained a degree of legitimacy. I have not searched for evidence to test
this proposition, but it may exist. One South African advocate told me, for
example, that he had been struck by union litigants' tendency to obey adverse court orders and appeal them, rather than simply to disobey them.
Finally, and perhaps most important, it is possible that the views South
Africans had of the old order's legal system have played a part in the shaping of the new South Africa-that is, in the gathering process of choice by
black and white South Africans of the sorts of laws and institutions with
which they are prepared to comply in the future. As we will see in the final
section of this article, it is quite clear that the new South African government is a decidedly legalistic construct and that its legal institutions very
much resemble those of the white-dominated government that it replaced.
It is much less certain what role, if any, attitudes toward the old legal system
played in the shaping of these institutions, but I will suggest that such attitudes did play a part.
Most of this article, however, focuses not on the link between legitimating attitudes and compliance but rather on the questions of whether
8. See Alan Hyde, "The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law," 1983 Wis. L.

Rev. 379.
9. Id. at 380.
10. Id. at 386-400.
11. See Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1990) ("Tyler, Why Obey Law").
12. There is some evidence that many black South Africans, presumably the most likely
to acknowledge no obligation to obey apartheid's laws, did feel a duty to comply with law. See
note 147 infta. Even the tactics of anti-apartheid groups within South Africa may have been,
as one observer emphasized to me, quite legalistic.
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such attitudes did exist and, if they did, what their sources were. In undertaking this inquiry, I mean to understand the concept of "legitimating attitudes" broadly, as "attitudes of support for an institution." "Support" is a
broad term; I use it to encompass such attitudes as "approval," "confidence"
and "admiration.1 3 These attitudes, of course, are not equivalent to a perceived "obligation to obey," the stance that people who acknowledge the
legitimacy of an institution presumably adopt toward it. Nor are approval,
confidence, and admiration even as closely linked to perceived obligations
to obey as "attachment, loyalty, and allegiance"-forms of the "'favorable
affective orientation'" identified by Tom Tyler as one component of legitimacy. But it seems reasonable to suggest that attitudes of approval or confidence are closer to feelings of attachment and allegiance than are, say,
attitudes of disapproval and disrespect. Hence I will argue that evidence of
approval or confidence in the South African legal system is evidence of a
measure of legitimacy being accorded to that system.
I begin, in part I, by arguing that, in fact, South Africans-and, in
particular, black South Africans, the victims of apartheid-did accord the
legal system under apartheid a measure of legitimacy. I have discussed this
proposition with a range of South Africans; their reactions have ranged
from believing this idea so obvious as to be unsurprising to seeing it as bizarrely incorrect. To demonstrate what I believe to be its accuracy, I will
rely primarily on a body of data drawn from three national polls of people's
confidence in various South African institutions. As this material will
demonstrate, many or even most black South Africans expressed considerable confidence in the South African legal system. These polling data are not
beyond all question, but I will look closely at the particular questions that
can be raised about these results and argue that despite the problems these
questions suggest the overall impression left by these polls is an accurate
one. The fact that black South Africans have accorded the legal system this
measure of legitimacy sets the stage for the analysis in part II, which will
seek to explain how black South Africans, and in particular "Africans"the most oppressed group of South African blacks-could have come to
hold such views and will also seek to assess the role that anti-apartheid
lawyering played in the generation of these views. It might be tempting to
assume that if Africans in any measure approved of the legal system under
apartheid, their doing so was a classic example of hegemony, understood as
"power that 'naturalizes' a social order, an institution, or even an everyday
practice so that 'how things are' seems inevitable and not the consequence
of particular historical actors, classes, and events. It tends to sustain the
interests of a society's dominant groups, while generally obscuring these in13. This discussion of the components of legitimacy is guided by Tyler, Why Obey Law
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terests in the eyes of subordinates."' 4 Pure instances of hegemony may be
rare, but at least, it might be thought, the use of law, even when it is an act
of resistance to domination and "expose[s] some of the terms of hegemony
and promote[s] oppositional visions of society," also causes "the contradictions in ruling ideologies... [to] be papered over and some aspects of domi15
nation transformed into unspoken 'truths.' ,
Though I do not want to deny the role of the "taken for granted" in
human thinking, the explanations of African attitudes to the legal system
that I offer do not rest primarily on the idea of popular acceptance of structures that are seen as inevitable, invisible, or natural. There are some respects in which Africans' attitudes seem very much governed by oppression,
but in most respects the processes that I suggest Africans may have followed
in evaluating the legal system can best be understood as conscious and rational responses to the situation in which they saw themselves. This is not
to say that these responses necessarily are objectively correct (whether or
not an assessment in those terms is even possible). Rather, these responses
tend to be the result of beliefs "subject to open contestation"-ideologiesrather than, or at least more immediately than, of perceptions "operat[ing]
16
unnoticed much of the time"-hegemony.
No simple model can capture the range of these responses, but I suggest
that three paradigms can help us to understand African thinking about the
legal system. Let me emphasize at the outset that these three paradigms-of
the groups I call the conservatives, the speakers, and the activists-are abstractions. Actual people may well have thought in the terms I associate
with all three of these paradigms. In many or most respects, as we will see,
these paradigms are not even theoretically inconsistent with each other; to
the extent that such inconsistencies do exist, we know that people are capable of simultaneously holding somewhat contradictory beliefs. With these
caveats, however, I believe these three paradigms clarify and link together a
number of strands of thinking that may well have contributed to Africans'
assessment of the South African legal system.
The first paradigm is of conservatism in African opinion, even under
apartheid. Many Africans have been remarkably forbearing in their judgments of South African institutions. In part, and sadly, this forbearance may
be the result of Africans' still laboring under the sense of their own inferiority that apartheid so vigorously and unjustly insisted on. In addition, how14. Susan F. Hirsch & Mindie Lazarus-Black, "Introduction-Performance and Paradox:
Exploring Law's Role in Hegemony and Resistance," in Mindie Lazarus-Black & Susan F.
Hirsch, eds., Contested States: Law, Hegemony and Resistance 1, 7 (1994) ("Hirsch & LazarusBlack, 'Introduction' "); see Jean Comaroff & John Comaroff, 1 Of Revelation and Revolution:
Christianity, Colonialism, and Consciousness in South Africa 23 (1991) ("Comaroff & Comaroff,
Revelation").
15. Hirsch & Lazarus-Black, "Introduction" at 8-9.
16. For this contrast between ideology and hegemony, see id. at 8; see also Comaroff &
Comaroff, Revelation 25.
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ever, Africans have their own heritage of communal order, and many today
embrace social values that are in many respects far from insurrectionary.
More prosaically, perhaps, but no less importantly, Africans' daily exposure
to the perils of both political and nonpolitical crime may well have disposed
many to look favorably even at stem measures taken by the country's official, although undemocratic, legal authorities. Moreover, many Africans
may have seen some virtue in law as a tool-far from perfect but better than
the available alternatives-for resolving some of the ordinary, civil legal
problems of their lives under apartheid.
The second paradigm focuses on Africans as speakers, determined and
enabled to tell their stories in court. Perhaps fueled by religion, perhaps
guided by fundamental self-definitions, Africans have maintained that they
had rights even when the statutes of their country disputed the claim. Perceiving themselves as rights holders, many may have also believed that if
they were given a proper hearing, their rights would be honored. Even when
they lacked this confidence, many may have welcomed the opportunity to
be heard, and heard even with some measure of respect, which the higher
South African courts did provide. Valuing the opportunity to speak in itself,
and encouraged by their faith in the power of persuasion, Africans may have
found reason to value the courts because speech was possible within their
confines.
The third paradigm looks to African activists-that is, to those men
and women who rejected apartheid sharply and impatiently and who were
disposed to join in political mobilization in an effort to bring the old system
down. These men and women, not so forgiving as the first group nor so full
of faith as the second, still may have found ground for acknowledging some
achievements of the South African legal system. Several factors may have
contributed to their assessments, including the striking infrequency of convictions in many political trials, the moral examples offered by some antiapartheid lawyers themselves, and the guidance offered by some African
leaders. But the result of these influences may not have been so much to
legitimize the existing legal system itself as to help legitimize some of that
system's highest but often unrealized ideals.
The final section of part II will revisit these three paradigms in order to
assess the impact of anti-apartheid lawyering on the thinking these paradigms reflect. "Anti-apartheid lawyering" is a broad term, and intentionally
so. I mean to encompass within it not only litigation challenging emergency
powers, or undercutting such egregious apartheid statutes as the Group Areas Act, but also much more workaday legal efforts, comparable to much
poverty legal service work in the United States, meant simply to address the
range of daily problems oppressed South Africans faced. Thus I include in
the concept of "anti-apartheid lawyering" not only defense work in political
trials but also paralegal efforts to obtain individuals' pension payments.
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Moreover, I include in this concept not only litigation that explicitly challenged the tenets of apartheid law (to the extent such challenges were possible) but also litigation that took for granted the existing, oppressive
framework of law and sought "merely" to ameliorate its application. Finally,
I include such work whether the lawyers or paralegals performing it would
have characterized themselves as liberals, or radicals, or even simply as lawyers-so long as they were acting with some sense of the injustice of the
aspects of the system of apartheid against which they maneuvered and litigated. Thus defined, the network of anti-apartheid lawyering constituted a
probably small but significant fraction of the South African legal profession,
including some of the country's most senior and most respected lawyers as
well as many who were less prominent; it also included what we will learn
was a very substantial network of paraprofessionals, many of them also political activists, who in effect brought law to the people in many areas of
South Africa.
What was the impact of this network's efforts on Africans' views of the
legal system? I will argue that the role of anti-apartheid lawyering probably
varied sharply depending on the concerns of the men and women affected;
moreover, anti-apartheid lawyers are not a uniform group, and different portions of this loose community may well have had different impacts. Nonetheless, I will suggest that in each of the three paradigms I have sketched
there was a potential role for anti-apartheid lawyering in enhancing Africans' views of the legal system. Whether as facilitators of modest improvements for conservatives, as facilitators of speech for those concerned to
speak out, or as useful and often admired advocates for the most political,
anti-apartheid lawyers likely have added to the measure of legitimacy Africans accorded to the legal system or to its ideals.
This observation in turn provides the predicate for the issue that part
III of this article examines, namely, whether the legitimizing impact of antiapartheid lawyering was desirable. Part of the promise of anti-apartheid
lawyering during the years of the old regime was that it might foster the rule
of law in some future day. Today, we are in that future-although not yet
far in-and so we now have the benefit of hindsight. I maintain that the
heritage of the legal challenges to apartheid has played some part in the
shaping of a new South African constitution, one which-in my judgment
wisely-places considerable reliance on the entrenchment of constitutional
rights to be protected by an independent judiciary.
I. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN
LEGAL SYSTEM
It might be thought that the demise of apartheid demonstrates conclusively that blacks, who make up over 85% of South Africa's population,
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opposed it and all its component parts. 17 Black opposition to apartheid is
very strong, but people are quite capable of opposing an oppressive system of
government without believing that every institution shaped by their oppressors is unjust. Those Americans who fought the Revolutionary War against
England were prepared to die to oppose continued British rule; only a few
years later, however, one of the authors of The Federalist Papers would think
it helpful to the cause of the new constitution to point quite approvingly to
aspects of British constitutional experience. 18 Moreover, even in a "crisis of
legitimacy," there may still be many people who continue to defend the
legitimacy of the imperiled institution. Again, American experience is instructive, for the Revolutionary War was not fought by a united mass of
colonists.' 9
In South Africa, similarly, there appear to have been many black victims of apartheid who did not find its injustices as unbearably offensive as
outsiders might presume they would have. In one 1983 survey, for example,
40% of the 1,516 African respondents said that they were "satisfied" or
"very satisfied" with race relations in South Africa; 38% expressed such
feelings about "respect from other race groups"; and 27% expressed these
positive feelings about "voting rights"-at a time when Africans had no
vote whatsoever in national elections in South Africa! Even in 1988, when
Africans' satisfaction with their lives had generally declined, 19% (of a total
of 1,199 respondents) still said they were satisfied or very satisfied with
regard to voting rights. 20 "Satisfaction" polls evidently tend to elicit very
high levels of expressed satisfaction everywhere in the world, and Africans
in South Africa were, overall, notably less satisfied with their lives, according to these polls, than people in most other countries. 21 Nonetheless these
figures suggest that even as apartheid ground to a halt there remained sub22
stantial numbers of Africans who were prepared to put up with it.
In this part, therefore, therefore, we examine just what black South
Africans actually did think about their system of justice. We will not find
that claims of a crisis of legitimacy were unfounded; we will find, however,
that a significant degree of black support for the system of justice persisted.
17. I use the term "Africans" to refer to South Africans of African descent; I use the
term "blacks" to refer to all South Africans of African, mixed-race ("Coloured," in the South
African terminology which, for the sake of clarity, I use), and Asian (Indian) descent.

18. See The FederalistNo. 47, at 303-4 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed. 1987).
19. One scholar refers to the "popular formula" that "the American population was in
equal parts Loyalist, patriot, and neutral," although he goes on to say that "it is to be suspected
that the patriot element was larger than the others, both before and after 1776." John Richard
Alden, The American Revolution 1775-1783 at 87 (1964). I am grateful to Kate McLeod of the
New York Law School Library for this information.
20. Valerie Moller, "Can't Get No Satisfaction: Quality of Life in the 1980s," 7 (1)
Indicator SA 43, 44 (1989).
21. Id. at 46.
22. Coloureds and Indians, for their part, were decidedly more satisfied, on most of these
points, than were Africans. Id. at 44.
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Most of the data we will examine come from public opinion surveys. We
can get a better feel for the range of blacks' views, however, if we begin with
more anecdotal evidence.
A.

In Their Own Words: Black South Africans Assess the
Legal System

In a striking interview study done in 1988, Robert Wilkins talked to a
number of black South African lawyers and found that they viewed the
legal system in which they worked as morally bankrupt, as in fact "a big
farce."2' 3 One described judges as "just as representative of the system as
[former State President] P. W. Botha. ''24 Wilkins reports that "[nlearly every
participant [in his study] thought that all judges were unfair and that one
could never get a fair trial."25 In the words of one lawyer, "if [a] matter is
seen as 'political,' they convict. '26 Most of these lawyers were nonetheless
prepared to see some of the existing judges reappointed under a postapartheid government, but "'would not reappoint most of these white
judges because of their attitudes' and would have to 'sort out the ones who
were racists before.' Some lawyers noted that the 'sorting out' process would
'27
leave precious few of the previous judges qualified for the new positions.
These harsh assessments undoubtedly represent one important strand of
black opinion, and I suspect are typical of the views of many or most black
lawyers. 28 Lawyers from the Black Lawyers Association, with whom I spoke
in late 1994, similarly spoke very critically of the legal system; 29 so did the
Acting National Director (not herself a lawyer) of another mainly black
30
legal group, the National Association of Democratic Lawyers.
Moreover, such views are not confined just to an educated elite. Most
black lawyers I interviewed believed that ordinary Africans were also
largely, if not entirely, critical of the legal system. Each of the three black
clients whom I formally interviewed also offered some criticism of the legal
system, although the two more activist clients seemed much more severe in
23. Robert L Wilkins, "The South African Legal System: Black Lawyers' Views," 7 (3)
TransAfr. F. 9,13 (1990).
24. Id.at 14.
25. Id.at 16.
26. Id.
27. Id.at 28.
28. According to an "editors' note" accompanying Wilkins's piece, "a significant
number" of these lawyers referred to South Africa not by that name but as "Azania." Id.at 30.
This choice of terminology may reflect their sympathy with groups such as the Azanian People's Organization or the Pan Africanist Congress, both of which have taken decidedly more
uncompromising positions toward whites than has the more popular African National

Congress.
29. Interview with Pansy Tlakula &Tom Lediga, 7 Nov. 1994.
30. Interview with Nomazizi Mtshotshosa, 7 Nov. 1994.
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their assessments. Jon Qwelane, a black South African journalist, recently

discussed black communities' assessment of the legal system on the basis of
research "in the library of the township streets and shebeens, in our taxis
and township homes."31 He believes that "the perception in our communities is that one's race determines one's fate in court. '32 More vividly, he
"suggest[s] that very few blacks, if any at all, will ever find anything 'fine
and proud' about our judicial system, because blacks know only too well that
the courts have treated most of them viciously."' 33 Though recognizing the

"notable but very few exceptional cases when the courts did mete out justice," he writes that "in our communities ... we hardly remember the exceptional judgments and instead remember the. 'hanging judges', the cold
34
and stony faces at the bench."'
Yet unqualified condemnation of the legal system is not a unanimously
held position among blacks. No less a figure than Nelson Mandela, seeking
to recuse the magistrate before whom he faced trial in 1962 on the ground
that the court was a "white man's court," was careful to say that his motion
was directed to institutional rather than personal unfairness. An experienced lawyer, Mandela spoke in the language of the law: "I hold Your
Worship in high esteem," he declared, "and I do not for one single moment
doubt your sense of fairness and justice. '3 5 He was convicted at that trial,

and in a subsequent case he was sentenced to life imprisonment. He spent
part of his prison years, however, in obtaining a graduate degree in law, and
after his release in 1990 one observer, Anthony Sampson, was struck by
"how much of Mandela's optimism depends on his respect for the law, and
his trust in the integrity of another lawyer, President de Klerk."'36 The year
after his release, on the day he received the news that his wife Winnie
Mandela had been sentenced to six years' imprisonment, he was asked if he
had "now lost all confidence in the South African legal system? Mr.
Mandela would not be drawn. 'It is premature,' he said, 'to deal with that
point now .... Once an appeal has been made, it is proper to leave the
'37
matter in the hands of the court.
31. Jon Qwelane, "How Our Communities Perceive Our Legal System," in Michelle
Norton, ed., Reshaping the Structures of Justicefor a Democratic South Africa (Papers of a Conference Organized by the National Association of Democratic Lawyers, Oct. 1993, Pretoria) 1, 1
(1994) ("Qwelane, 'Communities' ").
32. Id. at 3.
33. Id. at 4.
34. Id. at 5-6.
35. Nelson Mandela, "'Black Man in a White Court': First Court Statement, 1962," in
Mandela, The Struggle Is My Life 125 (London: International Defence & Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 1978). A South African lawyer has reminded me, however, that Mandela may
have needed to disavow any persorial attack on the magistrate for pragmatic legal reasons.
36. Anthony Sampson, "18 Days: A South African Journal," N.Y. Times Mag., 18
March 1990, at 38, 44.
37. Shaun Johnson, "Stoicism in the Mountains," in Johnson, Strange Days Indeed: Tales
from the Old and the Nearly New South Africa 168-69 (London: Bantam Press, 1993).
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More recently, in October 1993, Tokyo Sexwale, once a victim of police torture and now a prominent figure in the ANC, spoke to a crowd
outside the courtroom where the white alleged killers of prominent black
leader Chris Hani were being tried. According to a reporter, Sexwale told
the crowd: "This . . . was a trial from which the people were excluded.
'There is a white judge, a white prosecutor and white policemen. . .' (the
indignation was rising vocally) '. . . who I think have conducted an excellent investigation so far'. (The crowd's mood swung with a whump.)"'38 Like
the comments by Mandela, Sexwale's sentiments-though not the listening
crowd's-suggest a measure of respect for the white-run South African legal
39
system.
Perhaps Lucas Kgatitsoe, a leader and spokesman for the Magopa, probably the last community officially subjected to a "forced removal" in
apartheid South Africa, exemplifies better than any of the people quoted so
far the complexity of black South Africans' views of the legal system. He
spoke acidly about the old order: "as far as I'm concerned, I've never seen
any right or just ... law made by the former government." 40 When the
Magopa filed suit at one point in their long struggle, Mr. Kgatitsoe did not
expect to win, because he "knew that ... there's no justice in South Africa. '41 Yet the Magopa did win this case, on appeal to the Appellate Division, then South Africa's highest court.42
Why did the judges of the Appellate Division decide in favor of the
Magopa? Mr. Kgatitsoe answered: "I think the judges in Bloemfontein [site
of the Appellate Division] were bold enough to stand for the truth.... the
judges stood for the right as independent judges." Partly they did so because
"they knew that they are doing their duty." I asked if their decision was
solely the result of their knowledge of the law and of their duty, or was also
a matter of character; Mr. Kgatitose responded, "I think those judges were
38. Denis Beckett, "Textbook Law, Uncoloured by Pigment," The Star (Johannesburg),

14 Oct. 1993.

39. Neither Mandela's nor Sexwale's support is by any means unbounded. Mandela has

commented: "Some of us felt strongly that there was a fundamental difference between law
and justice, between legality and legitimacy." "Mandela Chides the Legal Profession," 3
RIGHTS: A Lawyers for Human Rights Publication,Oct. 1991, at 4, 5, quoted in S. Nadasen,
"Changing Law in a Changing Society: Reflections from a Black Perspective," 110 S. Aft. LJ.
580, 581 (1983). Sexwale has reportedly been criticized by a South African newspaper for
what it saw as encouragement to ANC supporters not to acknowledge "the integrity of the
court" in the same case he is discussing in the statement quoted in the text. "Finding Justice,"
Business Day, 18 Oct. 1993, reported in This Week in South Africa: News Highlights from the
South African Media (South African Consulate General, New York, 12-18 Oct. 1993).
40. Interview with Lucas Kgatitsoe, 3 Nov. 1994, transcript at 4. Though Mr. Kgatitsoe
was the sole or principal speaker during the taping of this interview, I met with him in the
company of other members of the "Reef" committee of the Magopa people. The interview
took place in his house in Soweto.
41. Id. at 5.
42. More v. Minister of Co-operation and Development, 1986 (1) SA 102 (A). It would
be many more years, however, before they were able to return to their land.
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... very sincere, and faithful to their calling." I asked him whether he felt
that most of the judges of the Supreme Court were fair, and he hesitated,
and said he could speak only of the judges in his case. Those judges, however, in his opinion, were "very fair" and judged neither with favoritism
toward the Magopa nor with bias against them. 'They did what they knew
that was right. Not to favor us... or the other party but to do what is
right." And, in the end, Mr. Kgatitsoe was not surprised, because there are
unbiased whites in South Africa and it is not surprising that someone
should care to see justice done.43
B.

The Survey Research on "Confidence" in the Legal
System

Let us turn from the words of individuals, compelling and revealing as
they can be, to the more opaque but potentially more systematic information available from survey research. Survey research in South Africa must
face complex problems of diversity, unfamiliarity, and probably suspicion
among those it seeks to study, and so its results surely require careful interpretation, all the more because the total sum of information gathered appears to be quite limited. Nonetheless, at least some polls do elicit strikingly
blunt answers from black respondents, and so their results deserve attention . 4 Here I focus primarily on the results of polls conducted by Markinor,
a leading South African commercial polling agency, in 1981, 1990, and
1993, to assess, among many other topics, the degree of confidence that
South Africans had in various institutions of their society. 45 These polls
indicate, first, that far greater numbers of black South Africans had, or used
to have, confidence in their legal system than might have been expected.
Second, these polls demonstrate that Africans in South Africa held substantially more favorable views of their legal system than they did of two related
institutions, the police and Parliament. Third, it is clear from these polls
that the views of black South Africans are not uniform and that different
racial and ethnic groups within the black population expressed differing assessments of South Africa's legal system. Before examining the results in
more detail, however, we must first consider carefully both the question
asked and the manner of its asking, so as to gauge better how much "confidence" we should have in the answers.

43. Kgatitsoe interview, 3 Nov. 1994, transcript at 7-9.
44. For example, consider the large proportions of urban Africans who told surveyors in
1985 and 1987 that they approved of "armed struggle" to bring about the end of apartheid.
See text at note 95 infra.
45. It is my understanding that Markinor did not poll on this question between 1981
and 1990.
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1. The Question
The question respondents were asked about confidence in institutions
was phrased essentially as follows: "Please indicate, for EACH item listed
here, how much confidence you have in them; is it a great deal, quite a lot,
not very much, or none at all?" 46 Then from 9 to 12 institutions were listed.
The order and items on the list appear to have varied somewhat over the
three runs of this poll, but in each case respondents were evidently asked
about the "legal system," the police, and Parliament, as well as various
47

others.
This question plainly has ambiguities. First, the meaning of "confidence" is not necessarily self-evident. Conceivably, respondents expressing
confidence in institutions meant that they confidently expected these institutions would behave in the unacceptable fashion that they had displayed in
the past. But this is a strained reading of the word confidence, and as we will
see, the relatively low ratings which black South Africans give to many
institutions in which we would expect them to have little confidence indicate that this reverse reading of the question cannot have been widely
shared.
Second, and more significantly, the meaning of the term "legal system"
is not self-evident. One problem with the term is that it would not be unreasonable to say that both the police and Parliament are part of the "legal
system." In that case, expressions of confidence in the legal system might
embrace, or simply repeat, judgments about these other institutions. In fact,
however, one of the most consistent features of the polling results is that
black South Africans do not express the same levels of confidence in these
three institutions; Africans, in particular, express greater confidence in the
legal system in each of the three polls than they do in the police or in

Parliament. 48
Thus it seems likely that respondents took the question concerning the
"legal system" to refer to something broader than, or altogether different
from, the police or Parliament. It is very likely, I believe, that respondents
took the term to refer, at least in part, to the courts. Plainly the courts are a
part of the legal system; they are also perhaps the most visible part of a

46. This is the text of the question as asked in 1990.
47. In 1990, the other institutions were the church, the armed forces, the education
system, the press, trade unions, the civil service, major companies, the social security system,
and the National Party. The lists in 1981 and 1993 appear to have been similar.
48. See text at notes 73-75 infra. These differences appear even when, as in 1990, respondents were asked about the legal system before they were asked about the police or Parliament. Apparently respondents differentiated between the legal system 'and these other
institutions, at least to some extent, even before polltakers separated the institutions out
through their questions.
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country's legal apparatus other than the police and the legislature. 49 Thus I
believe that the question concerning the "legal system" probably gives us an
indication of respondents' views of the South African judiciary. My own
concern, as I have said, is primarily with the courts; but if these polling
questions capture attitudes toward the courts as seen within a penumbra of
other legal institutions, then their focus is precisely mine.
One alternative possibility is that respondents took the term "the legal
system" to refer not to the particular legal system South Africa then had but
to the general idea of a legal system, or of law, as an institution of social
control. In that case; the relatively high confidence ratings we are about to
encounter for the legal system would be expressions of abstract approval for
a form of social ordering rather than for any concrete South African institution. This reading is not inconceivable. 50 Indeed, Markinor itself suggested
that rather high African approval of education in 1981 might be approval of
"education as such" and not of the educational system then in place.51 But
here I think Markinor may have underestimated the importance that Africans attached even to the atrocious system of education they then were
subjected to.
More broadly, there are two reasons why it seems unlikely that blacks'
appraisals of the legal system disregarded the realities (as the respondents
saw them) of South Africa's actual legal system. First, a number of the assessments blacks gave of South African institutions seem so bleak as to com52
pel the conclusion that they were directed at the systems then in place.
Given that, it would have been odd if poll respondents shifted their perspective when asked about the legal system. Second, the assessments of the legal
system vary dramatically over the three polls, with confidence ratings quite
53
substantial in 1981, even higher in 1990, and much lower in 1993. It

hardly seems likely that respondents' views of the abstract idea of law under49. Another possible component of the "legal system" would be the civil service.
Though the data I have on Africans' views of the civil service are not as complete as those on
their views of the legal system, the police, and Parliament, the data do suggest that urban
Africans differentiated at least to some extent between the "legal system" and the civil service, just as they did between the legal system and the police or Parliament. In 1981, more
urban Africans expressed a great deal of confidence in the legal system (39%) than offered
this view of the civil service (26%). Markinor 1981 at 92 (cited in note 51). In 1990, similarly,
urban Africans were more likely to express a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the legal
system (63%) than in the civil service (55%). Marknor 1990 at 68 (cited in note 56).
50. Because the poll questionnaires were probably often administered to African respondents in African languages, it is dearly possible that one source of ambiguity in the poll results
was the difficulty of translation. One black South African scholar suggested to me that a
likely translation of "legal system" might have pointed respondents toward thinking of the
idea of law in general.
51. See The Markinor South African Social Value Study-In Association with Gallup International 93 (March 1982) (cited as "Marknor 1981," since the polling for this study was done
in August-October 1981). In this poll, 39% of Africans expressed a great deal of confidence
in the education system.
52. See text and note at note 73 infra.
53. See text and notes at notes 64-72 infra.
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went such transformations, and so it does seem likely that what the respondents were addressing was their sense of the reality of their actual lives.
2.

The Asking of the Question

For these reasons, I believe that the question asked did tap South Africans' views of their judicial system. It might still be objected, however, that
the data are unreliable because the samples to whom the question was put
were unrepresentative or because the manner of asking was seriously flawed.
Though there may well be distortions in these data-for polling in South
Africa is a challenging enterprise-the Markinor polls appear to me to have
been carried out in generally appropriate fashion and to have elicited results
that are likely to be credible.
Certainly the polls reached samples of each of South Africa's major
racial groups. 54 The 1981 poll included 600 whites; 600 Africans, all living
in metropolitan areas; 200 Coloureds, all living in Cape Town; and 200
Asians, all in Durban.5 5 The 1990 poll covered 1,236 whites; 600 urban
Africans, including squatters, and 500 rural Africans (100 from each of five
"homelands"); 200 Coloureds; and 200 Asians. 56 The 1993 polls covered
804 whites with telephones, as well as 1,000 metropolitan Africans, including squatters but not including hostel dwellers, 400 metropolitan Coloureds,
57
and 400 metropolitan Asians.
54. In addition, it is worth mentioning that examination of the polling data for 1990
and 1993 confirms that the black South Africans polled came from a substantial range of
income and education levels. The 1981 data that I have do not make the socioeconomic
range of respondents clear, but Markinor's report states: "All samples were quota samples,
stratified by area and controlled within sex by: Age, Language/Ethnic group; Working status;
Household income." Mark/nor 1981 at 5 (punctuation modified).
55. Id. at 5. Most discussion of this poll in this article will not be based on this report,
however, but on the more detailed statistical materials, kindly provided to me by Mar Harris
of Markinor, on attitudes toward the legal system, Parliament, and the police. I cite these
materials as "Markinor 1981 Statistics."
56. See Markinor, The World Social Value Study-South Africa-Urban Written Report 5
(March 1991) (cited as "Markinor 1990," since the polling was done in October and November 1990). The 600 metropolitan Africans included squatters. Id. This report does not include
the data gathered for the 500 rural Africans polled; detailed statistical breakdowns on the
attitudes of urban and rural Africans, Coloured, and Asians toward the legal system, Parliament, and the police were provided to me by Mari Harris of Markinor and are cited as "Markinor 1990 Statistics."
The rural Africans polled came from the homelands of KwaZulu, Transkei, Lebowa,
Gazankulu, and Bophuthatswana. Ms. Harris has informed me that because of the relatively
small sample sizes (100 from each homeland), data on rural African opinion should be viewed
"only as indications." Letter from Mar Harris, 17 Nov. 1993.
57. This information is drawn from the statistical breakdowns, sent to me by Ms. Harris,
of data on attitudes toward the legal system, Parliament, and the police (cited as "Markinor
1993 Statistics") and from additional information which Ms. Harris provided to me concerning the methodology of another poll, Marknor Socio-politicalTrends (May 1993), in the course
of which "confidence" questions were put to Africans and whites (different groups were evidently polled in different months). The statistical breakdowns provided to me with respect to
whites are dated May 1993; those for Africans June 1993; and those for Coloureds and Asians
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In addition, the polls' survey methodology appears to have been reasonably designed to elicit candid and meaningful answers from the people
interviewed, and in particular from black South Africans.58 Ordinarily, and
particularly before the weakening of residential segregation in South Africa,
the interviewer and the interviewee would have been from the same racial
group (white, African, Coloured, or Asian). The poll questionnaires were
translated into a number of African languages. Moreover, all African interviewers would have been fluent in the African language most widely spoken
in the area being polled, and would have spoken one or more additional
African languages. African interviewees would have chosen whether to be
interviewed in English, Afrikaans, or an African language.5 9
Even with these rather careful polling procedures, it remains quite possible that some black South Africans would have refused to give candid
answers. Though they would not likely have been speaking with an interviewer of a different race, they might still have feared that their answers
might be used to their disadvantage by powerful whites. Thus it is conceivable that the levels of confidence that black South Africans expressed in the
legal system masked their true, more critical judgments.
Conceivable, yes; likely, no. This theory is hard to square with the
harsher judgments that the poll respondents did offer with respect to other
institutions. It is also hard to square with the startlingly blunt answers respondents gave to certain other questions. In 1981, for example, 47% of the
African respondents apparently agreed that "[t]here may be certain circumstances where terrorism is justified."60 That statement was not overtly foAugust 1993; though all of these are cited as "Markinor 1993 Statistics," the dates of the
printouts are also given.
58. One possible defect of the polls is that the "confidence" questions, at least in 1981
and 1990, evidently were part of much larger questionnaires. One South African pollster
suggested to me that respondents' attention might have flagged in the course of the polling.
While this may well be true, the fact that respondents did not express the same levels of
confidence in the related institutions of police, Parliament, and the legal system helps to
confirm that those polled were still focusing on each question asked.
59. Personal communications from Mar Harris of Markinor, Nov. 1994, April 1995.
The possibility of misunderstanding presumably was further reduced when the polltaker personally interviewed the respondent, rather than allowing the respondent to fill out the questionnaire himself or herself. In 1981, respondents of all races had the option to fill out the
questionnaires themselves, presumably on their own. See Markinor 1981 at 6. In 1990, primarily for reasons of expense, a random sample of white respondents apparently was selected from
a preestablished polling list, and the survey results for whites are principally based on the
responses of those who chose to fill in the questionnaires they received (1,086 of 2,500); all
black respondents, however, were interviewed on a "personal, face-to-face basis." Marknor
1990 at 6-8. In 1993, whites were apparently interviewed by telephone, while Africans were
interviewed in person, see Marknor Socio-politicalTrends 4. (I do not have specific information
on the interviewing method used with Coloured and Asian respondents in 1993.)
60. Mark/nor 1981 at 96. In 1985 and 1987 Mark Orkin, a decidedly anti-apartheid
South African pollster, found that 40 to 45% of urban Africans approved of "armed struggle
against the government's security forces" to bring about the end of apartheid. Mark Orkin,
"Politics, Social Change, and Black Attitudes to Sanctions," in Orkin, ed., Sanctions against
Apartheid 81, 85-86, 293 n.13 (1989) ("Orkin, 'Politics' "). Though Orkin's question was
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cused on South African affairs, but on another question, 24% of Africans
apparently agreed that "[tihe entire way our society is organised must be
radically changed by revolutionary action. ' 61 Even more startlingly, 13%
reported that they "had undertaken themselves or would be prepared to"
engage in "[u]sing personal violence like fighting with other demonstrators
or the police. '62 In addition, African respondents indicated that conduct
such as "fighting with the police" and "political assassination" could sometimes be justifiable. 63 In short, the people who answered the questions in
these polls were capable of being quite frank; it seems unlikely, therefore,
that they would have chosen to be specially discrete when it came time to
estimate their confidence in the legal system.
3.

Black South Africans' Confidence in Their Legal System

The words of the question and the manner of its asking give us reason
to take the answers seriously. What we find can be stated simply. Blacks
expressed a substantial level of confidence in the legal system in 1981 and
an even greater level in 1990. Even in 1993, when levels of confidence fell
dramatically, a significant fraction of the black community continued to
express confidence in the legal system. Let us now look more closely at the
details of these findings.
In its commentary on the 1981 poll, Markinor observed: "Overall, it is
quite obvious that Blacks [Africans], Coloureds and Asians do not identify
with institutions in which they largely have no part."64 Certainly far greater
percentages of Afrikaner whites than of blacks expressed a great deal of
focused on South Africa, while Markinor's question was not, the answers obtained seem comparable. The similarity is all the more significant since Orkin's question asked about "armed
struggle," while Markinor's used the much less attractive term "terrorism." A report of the
Human Sciences Research Council provides additional data of a similar cast. This report
indicates that "on the question of whether violence was an acceptable means [ofl
achieving
political aims, 63% of the Africans, 40% of the Indians, 37% of the coloureds and 30% of the
whites reacted positively." Human Sciences Research Council, Main Committee: HSRC Investigation into Intergroup Relations, The South African Society: Realities and Future Prospects
86 (1985) ("South African Society").
61. Markinor 1981 at 97 (cited in note 51).
62. Id. at 94. For this question and for those referred to in the previous two sentences of
the text, Markinor's report gives figures for "Total Blacks." It is not clear to me whether this
term is meant to embrace Coloureds and Asians as well as Africans (ordinarily Markinor uses
the term "Black" to refer to those whom I describe as "African"). If so, then the percentages of
Africans expressing these views would have been even higher than the figures I have given in
the text, since in each case the figure given for "Total Blacks" is higher than the figures for
Coloureds and Asians.
63. Id. at 78. Asked to indicate whether these and other forms of conduct were justifiable by choosing from a 10-point scale, on which "1"meant "never justified" and "10" meant
"always" justified, Africans overall rated "fighting with the police" at 3.7 and "political assassination" at "3.5." (The scores of whites for these two questions were 1.7 and 1.5, respectively;
Coloureds and Asians fell between whites and Africans, but closer to whites.)
64. Id. at 93.
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confidence in the armed forces, the police, and Parliament, and a considerably greater proportion of Afrikaners, compared to blacks, expressed such
confidence in the legal system. 65 But this poll also showed that half the
African respondents had a great deal (24%) or quite a lot (26%) of confidence in the legal system, as did even greater percentages of the Coloured
66
and Asian respondents.
Nine years later, in late 1990, Africans, Coloureds, and (somewhat
more ambiguously) Asians all expressed even higher levels of confidence in
the legal system, as table 1 shows. These are quite striking results. Apparently, in late 1990, over 60% of urban Africans and perhaps over 75% of
their rural counterparts felt a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in South
Africa's legal system. It does not seem possible to say of these data, as
Markinor wrote in summary of its findings in 1982, that "it is quite obvious
that Blacks, Coloureds and Asians do not identify with institutions in
which they largely have no part.' 67 On the contrary, black South Africans
showed a level of confidence in their country's legal system quite comparable to that displayed by whites.
TABLE 1

Confidence in the Legal System, 1990 (Percentages)

A great deal
Quite a lot
Not very much
None at all
Don't know
SOURCE:

Urban

Rural

Africans

Africans

Coloureds

Asians

Whites

27.4
35.3
21.3
10.7
5.3

32.9
45.9
12.8
3.6
4.9

13.1
43.1
28.7
1.6
13.4

31.7
30.2
21.0
7.4
9.6

28.2
47.2
18.0
2.9
3.7

Drawn from "Markinor 1990 Statistics" at 163, 171, Table 86/4 (cited in note 56).

65. Of Afrikaners, 56% expressed a great deal of confidence in the armed forces, 57%
had this attitude toward the police, and 37% had this view of Parliament. Asians, who were
more likely to express great confidence in these institutions than any other group of blacks,
were still much less likely than Afrikaners; only 29% expressed this attitude toward the armed
forces, 23% toward the police, and 18% toward Parliament. Of Afrikaners, 39% held this
opinion of the legal system; only 24% of Africans, 23% of Asians, and 11% of Coloureds
shared it. Id. at 92.
It should not be thought that all whites were enthusiastic about these institutions. English-speaking South Africans, long on the periphery of South African political power, were
less confident than Afrikaners were in each of these institutions, sometimes dramatically less.
Id. It is worth noting that the percentage of Africans expressing great confidence in the South
African legal system in this poll was greater than the percentage of English-speaking whites
who shared this sentiment (18%).
66. Of Coloureds, 51% expressed such confidence (11% stating they had a great deal of
confidence, and 40% that they had quite a lot). Of Asians, 59% had similar views (23% with
great confidence and 36% with quite a lot). "Markinor 1981 Statistics" at 46 (cited in note
55). Of whites, 81% had either a great deal or quite a lot of confidence. Id.
67. See text at note 64 supra.
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It might be argued that this remarkable peak in black South African
confidence should be understood merely as a measure of the hopes inspired
by State President F. W. de Klerk's release of Nelson Mandela and the
promise of negotiations-and not as any indication of the legitimacy of the
South African legal system. High hopes surely did play a part in these sentiments, but they do not justify ignoring these results. After all, the good
feelings of this poll are only somewhat better than the feelings expressed in
1981, a far less promising time. If the data from 1981 capture the sentiments
of black people discouraged by seemingly adamant repression by the government, and not yet energized by the mass mobilizations of the 1980s, they do
no more than to reflect the kinds of conditions under which blacks lived
throughout most of the era of apartheid. Additional data would of course
help us understand these two years' results better, but these two snapshots of
black opinion suggest that blacks may have asserted substantial confidence
in the South African legal system during many difficult years of South African life.
Perhaps more important, the fact that sentiments toward the legal system could improve as a result of hopes for the end of apartheid demonstrates
that black South African opinion was not irrevocably fixed. Strong as their
opposition was to apartheid itself, black South Africans apparently were not
utterly disenchanted with the institutions through which apartheid operated, and instead were prepared to revise their views of the institutions of
South African society if they believed those institutions had become forces
against, rather than for, the maintenance of injustice. Their confidence in
the legal system grew as a result; the same poll reflects that their confidence
6
in the police and in Parliament grew even more dramatically.
After such high hopes, disappointment may be inevitable, and the tortuous course of political developments in South Africa after 1991 certainly
gave frequent cause for dismay. The effects of this dismay appear in Markinor's 1993 survey.69 This time the percentage of urban Africans who expressed "a great deal" of confidence in the legal system was very small
(6.3%), though another 19.2% expressed "quite a lot" of confidence in it.
More than half the urban African population this time expressed little or no
confidence in South Africa's legal system. 70 Confidence in Parliament and
68. Of urban blacks, 53.6% expressed a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in Parliament in 1990 (and 68.9% of rural blacks); only 24% had expressed these sentiments in 1981.
Again, of urban blacks, 48.6% expressed such confidence in the police (and 69.2% of rural
blacks); only 31% had shared these feelings in 1981. "Markinor 1990 Statistics" at 166-67,
174-75 (cited in note 56); "Markinor 1981 Statistics" at 47 (cited in note 55).
69. Mari Harris of Markinor (personal communication, 17 Nov. 1993) informed me that
the impact of dashed hopes reflected in these data showed up in other Markinor surveys as
well.

70. Of urban Africans, 35% expressed "not very much" confidence in the legal system,
while another 25.7% expressed no confidence in it at all. "Markinor 1993 Statistics" at 20,
Table 7/3 (June 1993) (cited in note 57).
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the police had also plummeted. Only 18.7% of urban Africans now declared
a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the police, and 18.2% in Parlia71
ment, compared with the 25.5% who held these views of the legal system.
Asians and Coloureds also lost considerable confidence in South Africa's
legal system, Parliament, and police between 1991 and 1993; whites too lost
confidence in the legal system and in Parliament (see appendix 1).72 Anxiety and frustration took their toll in every segment of South African society
during these years. Even at the end of this period, however, it is worth
remembering that a quarter of the urban African population expressed considerable confidence in South Africa's legal system. Neither the frustrations
after 1991, nor the years of the state of emergency before then, nor the
thousands of largely unpunished political killings of recent years, had altogether dulled black South Africans' confidence in the nation's legal system.
4. Africans' Greater Confidence in the Legal System than in the
Police or Parliament
In each of these Markinor polls, Africans in South Africa show greater
confidence in the legal system than they do in two other central institutions
of South African government, the police and Parliament. In 1981, for example, 24% of the African population expressed a "great deal" of confidence in the legal system. More Africans expressed this degree of
confidence in the legal system than in the civil service (13%), the police
(11%), the armed forces (10%) or Parliament (8%). 73
71. Id. at 20, Table 7/3; 23, Table 7/6; 24, Table 7/7 (June 1993).
72. The levels of Coloured, Asian, and white confidence in the legal system in 1993 are
shown in the table in appendix 1. The changes in these groups' confidence in the police and
Parliament from 1990 to 1993 can be summarized from their mean confidence levels (calculated by scoring "a great deal" of confidence as 4, "quite a lot" as 3, "not very much" as 2, and
"none at all" as 1). Coloureds' mean level of confidence in the police fell from 2.66 in 1990 to
2.59 in 1993; their mean level of confidence in Parliament fell from 2.66 in 1990 to 2.32 in
1993. Asians' mean level of confidence in the police fell from 3.01 in 1990 to 2.60 in 1993;
their mean level of confidence in Parliament fell from 2.78 in 1990 to 2.25 in 1993. Whites'
mean level of confidence in the police rose from 3.24 in 1990 to 3.33 in 1993; their mean
level of confidence in Parliament fell from 2.81 in 1990 to 2.47 in 1993. See "Markinor 1993
Statistics" at 23, Table 7/6; 24, Table 7/7 (Aug. 1993) (cited in note 57) (separate tables for
Coloureds and Asians on identically paginated pages); id. at 22, Table 10/6; 23, Table 10/7
(May 1993) (whites); "Markinor 1990 Statistics" at 166, Table 86/7; 167, Table 86/8 (whites);
174, Table 86/7; 175, Table 86/8 (Coloureds and Asians) (cited in note 56). (All of these gaps
exceed the combined "standard errors" provided by Markinor for the 1990 and 1993 data,
with the exception of the modest fall in Coloureds' confidence in the police.)
73. Marklnor 1981 at 92 (cited in note 51). Smaller percentages also expressed this level
of confidence in "major companies" (22%), the press (18%), and trade unions (17%). In fact,
the only institutions in which higher percentages of Africans expressed a "great deal" of confidence were the church (45%) and the education system (39%).
The differences between Africans' views of the legal system and their views of the police
and Parliament are also evident in the mean confidence levels. For the legal system, Africans'
mean confidence level was 2.52; for the police, 2.04; and for Parliament, 1.91. "Markinor
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The 1990 data similarly indicate that Africans in South Africa-particularly urban Africans, always more radical than their rural counterpartswere more prepared to place their confidence in the legal system than in
the police or Parliament. As we have just seen, the levels of confidence
expressed even by urban Africans toward the police and Parliament at this
time are startlingly high. 4 High as these levels of confidence are, however,
they are not as high as the level of confidence in the legal system: 62.7% of
urban Africans had a great deal, or quite a lot, of confidence in the legal
system at this time, while 53.6% had such confidence in Parliament and
48.6% had such confidence in the police (table 2). Among rural Africans
the contrast is less stark, but table 2 reflects that 78.8% expressed these
levels of confidence in the legal system, while 69.2% expressed comparable
confidence in the police and 68.9% in Parliament.
TABLE 2
Urban and Rural African Confidence, 1990 (Percentages)
Urban Africans

Rural Africans

Legal

Legal

System

Police

Parliament

System

Police

Parliament

A great deal

27.4

21.4

20.9

32.9

34.5

38.0

Quite a lot
Not very much
None at all
Don't know

35.3
21.3
10.7
5.3

27.2
26.8
21.8
2.7

32.7
25.5
13.8
7.2

45.9
12.8
3.6
4.9

34.7
19.4
8.7
2.7

30.0
14.3
6.6
10.2

SouRc: "Markinor 1990 Statistics" (cited in note 56): for urban Africans, 171, Table 86/4;
174, Table 86/7;; 175, Table 86/8; for rural Africans, 163, Table 86/4; 166, Table 86/7; 167, Table
86/8.
NoTm: For urban Africans, the means are 2.84 for the legal system, 2.65 for Parliament, and
2.50 for the police. The gaps between these means all exceed the combined standard errors
reported with the data. For rural Africans, the means are 3.14 for the legal system, 3.12 for Parliament, and 2.98 for the police. Only the differences between the means for the legal system and for
Parliament, on the one hand, and the mean for the police, on the other, exceed the survey's
reported standard errors.

1981 Statistics" at 46-47 (cited in note 55). (These differences exceed the combined standard
errors reported with the data.)
The differences between Africans views' of the legal system and of the police and Parliament are also apparent in the data on the percentages of African respondents who made clear
that they did not have much confidence in these institutions. (These data are also significant
as an indication that a great many poll respondents were prepared to speak their mind, and
were apparently speaking it on the subject of the institutions they currently lived under,
rather than addressing more abstract questions of, say, the desirability of a legal system or of a
police force or a legislature.) In 1981, 75% of Africans said that they had either not very
much confidence, or none at all, in Parliament, while 68% expressed such attitudes about the
police, and 49% offered these views of the legal system. Id. at 47.
74. See note 68 supro.
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So, too, in 1993 urban Africans showed more confidence in the legal
system than in either of the two other institutions. They were not very
confident in any of these entities, but even in this period of disillusionment
they did not equate the three. Of urban Africans, 25.5% had a great deal or
quite a lot of confidence in the legal system at this point, as we have seen;
only 18.7% held this degree of confidence in the police, and 18.2% in
75
Parliament.
In more hopeful moods and less, then, Africans distinguish the system
of justice from other institutions and viewed it more favorably. This finding
is significant because it tells us that Africans' assessments of the system of
justice are not simply a function of their evaluations of all South African
institutions. Instead, we now know not only that Africans (and other
blacks) often held surprisingly favorable views of their legal system, and
never held entirely unfavorable views of it, but also that those views are, at
least in part, the result of Africans' evaluations of the particular features of
the system of justice that distinguish it from other South African institutions. It appears that this system-and thus, it would seem, the courts in
particular-enjoyed a measure of institutional prestige in African eyes
greater than that retained by either Parliament or the police. It is the task of
part II to explain the factors that may contribute to the measure of legitimacy the system of justice thus appears to enjoy.
5.

Divisions in Black Opinion

Before we undertake that task, however, we must first recognize that
the notion of legitimacy in the eyes of "blacks" can easily obscure the important differences that exist among blacks. In particular, we need to recognize the substantial gap that exists between the perceptions of Coloureds
and Asians, on the one hand, and Africans on the other. This gap may well
have become sharper during the years from 1981 to 1993, and its existence
suggests that what may earn the legal system some degree of legitimacy in
Africans' eyes may not be identical to what earns it a measure of legitimacy
in the eyes of other blacks. As we will see, differences have developed, or
persisted, between these groups' views of the legal system, and also-just as
significantly-between their comparative assessments of the legal system
and the police.
Africans, Coloureds, and Asians were all victims of apartheid. As
apartheid began to break up and black men and women began to focus more
on the choice among possible alternative futures than on the sources of
75. "Markinor 1993 Statistics" at 20, Table 7/3; 23, Table 7/6; 24, Table 7/7 (June 1993)
(cited in note 57). The mean confidence levels were 2.07 for the legal system, 1.76 for the
police, and 1.84 for Parliament. (The gaps between each of these exceed the corresponding
standard errors reported.)
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present inequalities, however, these groups' assessments of the legal system
seem to have developed differently. The views of Africans and Coloureds
have diverged, and the sentiments of Asians and Africans may have become
even more distinct than they were in 1981. In 1981, as we have seen, 50%
of urban Africans polled expressed a great deal, or quite a lot, of confidence
in the legal system; almost the same percentage of Coloureds held such
views (51%) while a somewhat greater proportion of Asians (59%) shared
these sentiments. 76 In 1990, as we have also seen, 62.7% of urban Africans
held such views; this time both Coloureds (56.2%) and Asians (61.9%)
were fairly comparable. 77 In 1993, finally, 25.5% of urban Africans expressed these levels of confidence; a distinctly higher 37.2% of Coloureds
and 35.1% of Asians, however, offered such views. 78 Coloureds and Asians,
in short, were apparently not so sharply disillusioned by the years between
1990 and 1993 as were Africans.
In addition, although Coloureds and Asians-like Africans-clearly
do not view all the legal institutions of their society identically, they have
not joined Africans in evaluating the legal system most favorably. Coloureds
and Asians, instead, have viewed the police with considerably greater generosity than have Africans. In 1981, all three groups viewed the legal system
more favorably than the police (and the police more favorably than Parliament), but for both Coloureds and Asians the gap between their assessments of the legal system and the police was very small. 7 9 In 1990, when
61.9% of urban Africans expressed confidence in the legal system and only
48.6% in the police, Coloureds and Asians gave the legal system less of an
edge-or none at all. 80 In 1993, finally, both Asians and Coloureds-un76. "Markinor 1981 Statistics" at 46 (cited in note 55). The mean confidence levels
were 2.525 (Africans), 2.50 (Coloureds), and 2.71 (Asians). Id. (Only the gaps between the
Asian mean on one hand, and the Coloured or African means on the other, exceed the

corresponding standard errors.) Though the African and Coloured means are very close, it is
striking that a much higher proportion of Africans (24%) than of Coloureds (11%) expressed
"a great deal" of confidence at this point. Id.
77. "Markinor 1990 Statistics" at 163, Table 86/4; 171, Table 86/4 (cited in note 56).
The mean confidence levels for urban Africans were 2.84, for Coloureds 2.78, and for Asians
2.95. (Only the gap between Coloureds and Asians exceeds the corresponding standard
errors.)

78. The mean confidence levels also reflect this gap: the levels for Africans were 2.07,
for Coloureds 2.42, and for Asians 2.33. "Markinor 1993 Statistics" at 20, Table 7/3 (June
1993) (urban Africans); id. at 20, Table 7/3 (Aug. 1993) (separate tables for Coloureds and
Asians on two identically numbered pages) (cited in note 57). (The gaps between each of
these means exceed the reported standard errors.)
79. The mean confidence levels for Africans were 2.52 for the legal system and 2.04 for
the police; for Coloureds they were 2.50 for the legal system and 2.48 for the police; and for
Asians they were 2.71 for the legal system and 2.70 for the police. "Markinor 1981 Statistics"
at 46-47 (cited in note 55). Unsurprisingly, only the two African assessments differ by more
than the corresponding standard errors.
80. "Markinor 1990 Statistics" at 171, Table 86/4; 174, Table 86/7 (cited in note 56). Of
Coloureds, 59.4% expressed a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the police, while
56.2% offered such views of the legal system; 65.0% of Asians had such views of the police,
while 61.9% expressed these sentiments towards the legal system.
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like Africans-were more confident in the police than they were in the
legal system. The levels of confidence these groups expressed in the police
are quite striking-49.3% of Asians and 50.5% of Coloureds expressed a
great deal, or quite a lot, of confidence in the police, while only 18.7% of
urban Africans held such views.8 1 The fact that these two groups, like South
Africa's whites,8 2 expressed greater confidence in the police than in the
legal system or Parliament may reflect relatively acute "law and order" anxieties in these groups, in contrast to persistent or growing anger at the police
among Africans.
The divisions in black opinion demonstrated by these statistics point
to a differentiation in the sources of legitimation as well. Coloureds and
Asians were in many respects less acutely victimized by apartheid, particularly in its late years, than were Africans; nonetheless all these groups had
strong reason to oppose the system of apartheid, and thus to find common
ground with each other. As apartheid came to an end, however, black
South Africans' attention inevitably turned from an attack on the old order
to the shaping of the new. As Coloureds and Asians made this transition,
they came to give substantial support to the National Party, formerly the

Measured by mean confidence levels, Coloureds' and Asians' preference for the police
fades, but the contrast between their views and those of Africans remains. Urban Africans'
mean confidence in the legal system (2.84) was considerably greater than their confidence in
the police (2.50). (Rural Africans also were more confident in the legal system, but not so
much (3.14 compared with 2.98).) Coloureds' mean confidence in the legal system, by contrast, was modestly greater than their confidence in the police (2.78 compared with 2.66).
Meanwhile, Asians' mean confidence in the legal system was slightly lower than their confidence in the police (3.01 compared with 2.95), although this gap, unlike the others mentioned, fell within the compass of the corresponding standard errors. Id.at 163, Table 86/4;
166, Table 86/7; 171, Table 86/4; 174, Table 86/7.
81. "Markinor 1993 Statistics" at 20, Table 7/3; 23, Table 7/6 (Aug. 1993) (Coloureds
and Asians) (separate tables for Coloureds and Asians on two identically numbered pages); id.
at 20, Table 7/3; 23, Table 7/6 (June 1993) (Africans) (cited in note 57).
The mean confidence levels for Asians were 2.33 for the legal system and 2.60 for the
police; those for Coloureds were 2.42 for the legal system and 2.59 for the police. Asians and
Coloureds were least confident in Parliament, for which Asians' mean confidence level was
2.25 and Coloureds' was 2.32. For urban African means, see note 75 supra. The differences
within each group in its attitudes to different institutions all exceed the corresponding standard errors, with the exception of the difference between Asians' mean confidence levels in
Parliament and the legal system.
The proportion of the Coloured population that expressed a "great deal" of confidence in
the police had actually risen, from 12% in 1981 and 9.3% in 1990 to 18.7% in 1993-this at
a time when South African confidence in general was faltering. "Markinor 1981 Statistics" at
47 (cited in note 55); "Markinor 1990 Statistics" at 174, Table 86/7 (cited in note 56);
"Markinor 1993 Statistics" at 23, Table 7/6 (Aug. 1993) (cited in note 57).
82. Whites were more confident in all these institutions than were any of the black
groups surveyed. Whites resembled Asians and Coloureds, however, and differed from Africans, in having the greatest confidence in the police. In 1993, 85.5% of whites expressed a
great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the police; 52.1% expressed such confidence in the
legal system; and 45.9% expressed this measure of confidence in Parliament. "Markinor 1993
Statistics" at 19, Table 10/3; 22, Table 10/6; 23, Table 10/7 (May 1993) (cited in note 57).
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all-white champion of apartheid. 83 A large majority of Africans, in contrast,
gave their support to the African National Congress. According to the 1993
Markinor data, those Coloureds and Asians then supporting the National
Party were among the strongest supporters of the South African legal system.84 Coloureds and Asians who supported the National Party also appeared to be considerably more likely than those who supported the African
National Congress to place greater confidence in the police than in the
85
legal system.
Put in terms of legitimation, these findings suggest that South Africans
now must assess competing visions of legitimation and that those South
Africans who find the African National Congress' vision (as they perceive
it) unattractive are more disposed both to find other political homes and to
look forgivingly at South Africa's existing institutions.8 6 I do not suggest
that the splits in black opinion between Africans, Coloureds, and Asians are
absolute, but to the extent that these divisions exist they complicate our
study of the sources of legitimation of the legal system. In the analysis that
follows, I concentrate on identifying the sources of African opinion; in
adopting this focus, we will be looking at the extent of legitimation among
those South Africans who have been the most acutely victimized by
apartheid and its institutions.
African opinion, in any event, is also diverse. We have already found
that Africans do not express uniform views about their country's institu83. When South Africa's first nonracial national elections were held, in April 1994, a
majority of Coloureds and Asians apparently voted for the National Party. Patti Waldmeir &
Michael Holman, "South African Elections: Spirit of Conciliation Sweeps Aside Letter of
Vote," Fin. Tmes (London), 7 May 1994, at 3. See also Kenneth B. Noble, "South Africa's
Indians Shift Loyalties," N.Y. Tmes, 22 April 1994, at A8.
84. Coloured respondents preferring the National Party (over half of the weighted total
of all those polled) were more confident in the legal system than Coloureds with any other
preference, in most cases by margins exceeding the applicable standard errors. Asian respondents preferring the National Party (about 42% of the weighted total of all Asians polled and
the largest single grouping) were more confident in the legal system than those intending not
to vote and those preferring the African National Congress (the next two largest groupings),
again by amounts exceeding the applicable standard errors. "Markinor 1993 Statistics" at 20,
Table 7/3 (Aug. 1993) (separate tables for Coloureds and Asians on identically paginated
pages) (cited in note 57).
85. These contrasts can be seen in the mean confidence levels for the various groups.
Asian supporters of the National Party have a confidence level of 2.76 for the police, a level
higher than their confidence in the legal system (2.44); by contrast, the confidence of Asian
supporters of the African National Congress in the police is only slightly greater than their
confidence in the legal system (2.15 compared with 2.09, a difference within the reported
standard errors of the survey). Id. at 20, Table 7/3; 23, Table 7/6 (Aug. 1993).
For Coloured supporters of the National Party, the mean confidence level for the legal
system is 2.59, lower than their level for the police (2.85). In contrast, Coloured supporters of
the African National Congress have a confidence level for the legal system slightly higher
than their confidence in the police (2.20 compared with 2.10, a difference within the reported standard errors of the survey). Id. (identically paginated, separate tables for Coloureds).
86. I have sketched what I saw as competing visions of legitimation in the shaping of a
post-apartheid South Africa in Stephen Ellmann, "Visions of Legitimation in Old and New
South Africa: A Summary and Response," 16 Legal Stud. F. 193 (1992).
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tions. We will need to bear in mind, moreover, that different groups of
Africans express different sets of views. Rural Africans tend to be more conservative than their urban counterparts.8 7 Zulu (many part of the Inkatha
movement) tend to be more conservative than Xhosa (many part of the
African National Congress or more radical bodies), with such groups as
Sotho in between these two extremes.88 The old tend to be among those
who are most confident in the legal system (though the young do not prove
as consistently radical as their prominence in street resistance to the system
of apartheid might have suggested); in the cities, women may also be more
confident than men.8 9 Education and income also affect Africans' opinions,
and the data offer some suggestions that, despite the sharply critical views
expressed by many African lawyers, in general those Africans who are relatively more privileged in terms of education and income hold somewhat
more confidence in the legal system than do many of their counterparts. In
many respects, however, Africans of widely varying income and education
share similar views of South African institutions (see appendix 2). In determining what the sources of legitimation of South Africa's legal system
among Africans might be, I will not offer a subgroup-by-subgroup analysis.
It will be important, however, for us to distinguish broadly between different possible emphases in African thinking; as we will see, the legitimating
factors at work may operate quite differently depending on the perspective,
or perspectives, that particular Africans adopt.

87. For examples of this difference, see tables 1 and 2; Orkin, "Politics" at 93-94 (cited
in note 60). As of 1987, about 59% of the African population of South Africa above the age
of 16 was rural, 14% small-town, and only 27 % metropolitan, id. at 294 n.39. Orkin, at 96,
comments that "the vast metropolitan townships... set the political pace."
Attitudes of rural Africans also vary; in 1991 the mean levels of confidence in the legal
system were 3.06 among rural Africans in KwaZulu, 3.08 in the Transkei, 3.38 in Lebowa,
2.76 in Gazankulu, and 3.14 in Bophuthatswana. "Markinor 1990 Statistics" at 163, Table 86/
4 (cited in note 56). As noted earlier, however, these data are based on samples of only 100
people in each area, and so, according to Marl Harris of Markinor, should be viewed "only as
indications."
88. E.g., the mean confidence level for the legal system among urban Zulu in 1990 was
3.05, among urban Xhosa 2.66, and among urban "Tswana/Sotho" 2.83. The gaps between
each pair of groups exceed the poll's standard errors. Id. at 171, Table 86/4. Similar findings
have been made in other polls. Donald L. Horowitz, A DemocraticSouth Africa? Constitutional
Engineering in a Divided Society 58 (1991) ("Horowitz, Democratic South Aftica").
89. Among urban Africans the oldest people are always among those with more confidence in the legal system; in 1993, the youngest were the least confident, but that had not
been true in earlier years. See "Markinor 1981 Statistics" at 46 (cited in note 55); "Markinor
1990 Statistics" at 171, Table 86/4 (cited in note 56); "Markinor 1993 Statistics" at 20, Table
7/3 (cited in note 57). (Some of the comparisons between age groups, however, fall within the
data's standard errors.)
From the same sources we can compare the confidence held by men and women. Urban
women are more confident in each of the three polls, although only in 1993 does this gender
gap exceed the reported standard errors. Rural women in 1990, however, were less confident
than their male counterparts, and this gap exceeded the reported standard errors.
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6. The Confirmation of Other Polls
Before turning to an exploration of African thinking meant to explain
the Markinor data, however, it is important to offer one further form of
confirmation of those data-namely, the results of other polls. None of
these polls has the combination of national scope and specific focus on the
legal system that the Markinor polls do, but they do reach results whose
flavor is similar to Markinor's. Moreover, these polls come from researchers,
or institutions, occupying quite different spots on the South African political spectrum. Together these polls suggest that, despite the cogency of some
anecdotal evidence to the contrary, there is in fact a sizable body of African
opinion that accorded more legitimacy to the South African legal system
than many observers might have assumed.
One striking study is the work of researchers associated with the
Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), a body which appears to have
a quite conservative reputation in South Africa. In this 1988 interview
study of adults in two African townships in the Durban area, KwaMashu
and Umlazi, 40.9% of the people interviewed agreed with the statement
that "[i]n this country nobody will be sentenced to prison without good
reason," and 29.3% agreed that "[iln the courts all people are treated
justly."90
Another significant study is the work of David Everatt of the Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE), a strongly anti-apartheid polling
agency. This study is based on information recently gathered by CASE for
the "Joint Enrichment Project" as a "national baseline survey of the attitudes and life circumstances of young people of all races in South Africa,
aged between 16 and 30 years of age." 91 The study does not focus on courts;

it does, however, investigate young people's attitudes toward law-breaking
and toward the police, and so its findings are very relevant to an assessment
of attitudes toward the legal system. African young people were for many
years extremely prominent in the struggle against apartheid, and it might
have been thought that if any group would express uncompromisingly hostile views toward the police, it would be these young people. In fact, however, 51% of African youth disagreed or disagreed strongly with the
proposition that "the police are the enemy"; 62% agreed or strongly agreed
90. Rita Esterhuysen, "Views on Aspects of the Criminal Justice System," in J. M. L6tter,
L B. G. Ndbandaba, & Rita Esterhuysen, Crime and Its Impact: A Study in a Black Metropolitan
Area 184, 224, 225 (1990) ("KwaMashufUmlazi Study").
91. David Everatt, "A Violent Generationr' (n.d.) ("Everatt, 'A Violent Generation?' "). Dr. Everatt writes in a forthcoming article, an excerpt of which he kindly provided
to me, that "2200 respondents of all races were interviewed for up to an hour and a quarter in
a face-to-face questionnaire administered in the preferred language of the respondent." The
questionnaire "went into the field in November/December 1992." The remainder of this paragraph is drawn from data printouts provided by Dr. Everatt.
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that "the police protect the community"; and 47% agreed or strongly agreed
that "the police can be trusted."
Against the background of these figures, and of those gathered in the
92
KwaMashulUmlazi study, the Markinor results look entirely plausible. No
doubt the exact magnitude and intensity of Africans' confidence in the
South African legal system under apartheid can still be debated. But we
should now acknowledge that Africans did have a considerable measure of
such confidence, and turn from investigating the existence of such attitudes
to explaining their genesis.
II.

THE SOURCES OF AFRICANS' ASSESSMENTS OF
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL SYSTEM

The data reviewed in the previous part suggest that a sizable number of
Africans in South Africa, sometimes more than half, retained a considerable
degree of confidence in the South African legal system. Certainly there
were always many Africans, and again sometimes more than half, who did
not have such confidence and who, on the contrary, may have viewed the
system, as did the lawyers in Wilkins's study, as a racist farce. Certainly, too,
these South Africans had ample reason to deny the legitimacy of the legal
system-a system in which an almost entirely white judiciary and a
predominantly white legal profession applied laws made by a Parliament in
which Africans had no representation at all, and applied them in an often
conservative and sometimes blatantly racist fashion. 93 For observers of
South Africa, however, it is easy to see why blacks would deny the legitimacy of its legal system and why the gathering intensity of this denial would
amount to a crisis of legitimacy; it is more difficult to understand why some
of them would acknowledge its legitimacy instead. The first task of this part
will be to explain this measure of acknowledgment. The second will be to
92. Dennis Davis, a legal scholar who relentlessly attacked the law of apartheid, has
reported finding considerable faith in the Supreme Courts of South Africa in a pilot study he
conducted among black South Africans in the Cape Town area. He comments: "While it is
widely acknowledged that the legitimacy of the South African legal system is in crisis and has
been in crisis for a long time, a surprising level of confidence still exists in some legal institutions such as the Supreme Court." D. M. Davis, "Remaking the South African Legal Order,"
18 Soc. Just. 65, 77 (1991).
One other study of South Africans' attitudes toward their legal system is mentioned in an
HSRC report. This 1985 report, South African Society, at 134 (cited in note 60), characterizes
whites and Africans as "differ[ing] virtually diametrically in their evaluation of the administration of justice and related matters." The report refers to research showing that "whites had
the most positive impression of South African law and Africans the most negative, with
coloureds and Indians about midway between these two extremes. The same patterns emerged
in respect of obeying the law and the perception of the police and the administration of
justice." Unfortunately the report does not set out the underlying data.
93. John Dugard cogently sets out these and other sources of the challenge to the legitimacy of South African law in Dugard, Last Years 103-11 (cited in note 1).
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return to the starting point of this inquiry-the concern that anti-apartheid
lawyering might have paradoxically contributed to enhancing the legitimacy of the legal system on which apartheid in good measure rested-and
assess the role this lawyering work may have played in the processes that
appear to account for Africans' feelings toward the legal system.
Let me emphasize that I do not suggest that Africans in substantial
numbers accorded the South African legal system unalloyed legitimacy, nor
do I propose to offer explanations meant to account for any such unqualified allegiance. The measure of legitimacy I argue black South Africans
gave to the legal system is consistent with simultaneous, and deeply held,
anger over the injustice of apartheid and, for that matter, over the injustices
worked in the courts-although I suspect many black South Africans who
had some respect for the courts also tried to avert their eyes as far as possible
from the injustices of the system under which they lived. This measure of
legitimacy is also consistent with disobedience to the law, for it is not
strange for human beings to recognize some virtue in people or institutions
that they sharply oppose 94-although I believe it is quite possible that Africans' refusals to obey South African laws would have been even more widespread in the absence of this sentiment. With all these qualifications,
however, we should not turn away from the startling question that the
Markinor data pose: Why did so many Africans feel considerable confidence
in the South African legal system?
In considering the possible sources of this measure of legitimacy, we
need to keep in mind the variations in African opinion we have just encountered. To explain these survey data, moreover, we must go well beyond
the boundaries of survey questions and answers. We will need to infer, and
even to speculate, so as to tease out thoughts and connections that may lie
behind the blunter responses that polls can pick up. I will try to capture the
range of African opinion that might plausibly have contributed to the legitimacy of the legal system through a focus on three paradigms. The first is
"the conservative," forbearing, acutely concerned with issues of order and
security and perhaps with other day-to-day concerns of life, and perhaps
disposed to be deferential to institutions of white authority. The second is
"the speaker," determined to speak out, fueled by faith in the truth or power
of his or her speech, and welcoming the opportunity to be heard that courts
could provide. The third is "the activist," neither so patient as the first
group nor so infused with faith as the second, but adamantly determined to
bring down apartheid, and judging institutions and people by their contribution to that goal.

94. See Tyler, Why Obey Law at 62 (cited in note 11), observing: "It seems plausible
that the strength of the influence of legitimacy on behavior will vary depending on other
factors."
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These paradigms are abstractions; no actual person is likely to fit precisely into any one of the three, and it is very possible that actual people
have firm intellectual commitments that I would classify as falling in separate paradigms. But it is not my purpose to prove the empirical validity of
the paradigms as such. Rather, I utilize them because they appear to provide
coherent ways to bring together threads of thought and sentiment that I do
suggest contributed to Africans' assessment of the South African legal system. These threads of perception and judgment may seem unlikely to some
readers. Nonetheless, I advance these inferences in order to explain the surprising, but apparently real, phenomenon of Africans' partial acceptance of
the legitimacy of the South African legal system. Let us now look more
closely at the thinking exemplified by each of these three paradigms and at
the evidence that such thinking actually takes place, and, finally, at the role
that anti-apartheid lawyering may have played in encouraging it.
A.

The Conservatives

What I am calling a conservative paradigm is not a set of beliefs that
are entirely interwoven, or even fully consistent, with each other. Nevertheless, there appear to be many Africans in South Africa who, despite their
opposition to apartheid, have been notably moderate in many of their aspirations for change. So, too, there seem to have been many Africans for
whom such concerns as "law and order" or putting food on the table were
more salient than broad political transformation. And there may also have
been, even in the 1980s, a significant number of Africans still affected by
the feeling of inferiority that South African apartheid, like American segregation, fostered. Each of these sentiments may be called "conservative," and
each of them could have reinforced the others-although I do not at all
suggest that every African who held some conservative positions held all of
the beliefs I am about to discuss.
1. Africans' Moderate Responses to South African Institutions
It might be thought that Africans, so long victimized by apartheid,
would have come at last to reject every institution associated with it, wholly
and unqualifiedly. African anger is real. As noted earlier, one researcher,
Mark Orkin, found that 40% of urban Africans in 1985, and 45% two years
later, approved of "[a]rmed struggle against the government's security forces"
to bring about the end of apartheid. 95 Moreover, this anger is sometimes
directed precisely against judicial institutions. For example, not long ago a
95. Orkin, "Politics" at 85-86, 293 n.13 (cited in note 60). For other surveys producing
comparable findings, see text and note at note 60.
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leader of the Pan Africanist Congress issued a veiled threat that representatives of the Goldstone Commission-an independent commission headed
by a white judge noted for his efforts to reduce the injustice of apartheid
laws-would be killed if they attempted to inspect his organization's military camps. 96 As real as African anger is, however, it is not the only consideration Africans took into account as they looked at South African
institutions under apartheid.
In a variety of respects, rather, Africans prove to be decidedly less radical than might have been imagined. Lawrence Schlemmer, seemingly a
more politically conservative researcher than Orkin, found in 1992 that an
overwhelming majority of all population groups preferred "leaders who
wanted to talk and negotiate [to] those who wanted to maintain pressure on
and weaken opponents." 97 In this same survey, only 43% of Africans polled
definitely endorsed the de Klerk government's "immediate resign[ation] in
favour of an interim government. 98s Perhaps this less than unanimous support for de Klerk's resignation partially reflected many Africans' continued
belief in de Klerk's sincerity in seeking to end apartheid. 99 And it may also
have reflected the considerable measure of approval that Africans had accorded to state presidents as far back as 1979; according to Markinor, urban
African approval of the state president's leadership of the country never fell
below 23% between 1979 and late 1993, and was below 30% only during
the first two years of the states of emergency of the 1980s. 100
This considerable forbearance shows up in Africans' assessments of particular issues as well. Donald Horowitz reports a number of surveys in which
Africans expressed support for power sharing, rather than African control,
in a future South Africa. 01' A survey in mid-1991 found that most Africans
96. Maxwell Nemadzivhanani, the PAC's "national organiser," told a crowd: "Goldstone
is welcome to enter Apla camps, but he should remember what happened to Piet Retief in
Dingane's kraal." (Retief was killed.) Pamela Dube, "War Talk from PAC's 'Saddam,'" Weekly
Mail & Guardian, 17-23 Sept. 1993, at 6.
97. "Between Negotiation and Resistance: Views of Rank-and-File Party Supporters,"
Info. Update, Dec. 1992, 1, at 2.
98. Id. at 1-2. Only a few Africans (9%), however, definitely opposed this idea. Id. at 2.
The survey data came from "personal interviews" in October 1992 of 200 Asian, 1,100 African, 300 Coloured, and 400 white respondents. Elsa Thirion & Mathilda Barnardt, "Methodology," Info. Update, Dec. 1992, at 55.
99. At the end of the difficult year of 1991, "still more than half [52%] of [Africans]
were convinced that de Klerk was sincere in his efforts to rid the country of racial discrimination." "Just how sincere is de Klerk in his efforts to eradicate racial discrimination?" Info.
Update at 26 (Special Update Report 1991). By May 1993, however, only 6% of metropolitan
Africans felt that de Klerk was leading the country "very well," and only another 29% felt he
was leading "fairly well." Markinor, Press Release: "Political Parties/Leaders," 15 July 1993, at
1, 5.
100. Markinor, Socio-political Trends 1993/11 (Nov. 1993).
101. Horowitz, Democratic South Africa 101-3 & n.46 (cited in note 88). Horowitz also
notes, however, that "Black opinion may ultimately be more equivocal than it is depicted
here," id., and later reports a study of African students, whose attitudes toward a future described as "Black hegemony" are much more positive. Id. at 109-10.
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believed that a future Bill of Rights should protect "the rights of minority
groups, be they racial, religious or cultural minorities"-a concept close to
the heart of many whites, who see themselves as such a minority. The same

survey also found that a majority of Africans felt that "the right to own
property [should] be protected in a Bill of Rights"-again a position with
which whites, as the dominant property-owners in South Africa, have reason to concur. 0 2 Africans' support for these positions may reflect judgments
of their own interests rather than patience with whites' concerns; still another survey, however, found substantial variations in Africans' views on
strong affirmative action measures explicitly targeted, in whole or in part, to
aid Africans. 10 3 Several studies from the 1980s also offered evidence that
Africans, despite being sharply critical of the policies of current employers,

still tended to support the principle of private ownership of businesses. 104
For many Africans, it would seem, the desire to eradicate the injustice
of apartheid by no means translated to a rejection of all the institutions that
had been used and tainted by apartheid. Jeremy Seekings has observed that,
"as Edmund Burke himself acknowledged (with respect to Britain's colonies
at*the close of the eighteenth century), the denial of freedom or the

franchise does not make everyone a radical. Within the parameters of discontent there exists a wide range of ideological orientations. Everyday poli-

tics in South African townships rarely concerned the 'national question',
providing space for particular forms of conservatism to maintain popular

support."'

05

102. "On a South African Bill of Rights," Info. Update, July 1991, 18, at 18-19. This
survey was based on a telephone sample of 2,138 people, including about 912 Africans.
"Methodology," Info. Update, July 1991, at 30.
103. In this July 1992 survey, 2,000 people, including 1,100 Africans, were personally
interviewed. Elsa Thirion & Ria Joubert, "Methodology," Info. Update, Sept. 1992, at 54.
They were presented with a series of proposed social policies and for each were asked whether
they would "demand" it, "like it but not demand it," "dislike it but not resist it," or "fight and
resist it." Lawrence Schlemmer, "Prospects for Socio-economic Conflict in South Africa: Majority Expectations, Minority Resistance," Info. Update, Sept. 1992, 22, at 22. Only 46% of
Africans said that they would "demand" that "[w]hites in civil service must be retrenched to
make way for blacks, coloureds and Asians," and only 43% said they would demand that
"[clompanies [be] forced to appoint more blacks until certain goals are reached." Id.at 27. On
each of these questions, different strata of the African population ranged from below 10%
"demanding" the policies to over 80%. Id. Schlemmer concludes, at 28, that African "attitudes and expectations vary strongly from issue to issue," and characterizes African opinion as
showing a "'pragmatic' variability."
104. See Lawrence Schlemmer, "Black Workers and the Alternative: Attitudes towards
Socialism," 3 (4) Indicator SA 1, 3-4 (Autumn 1986). Markinor also found strong support for
private~ownership among urban Africans in 1990, although almost half wanted "owners and
employees together [to] run the business." Markinor 1990 at 132-33 (cited in note 56).
105. Jeremy Seekings, "Visions of 'Community' in South Africa's Informal Township
Courts" 7 (presented at the Joint Meeting of the Law & Society Association and Research
Committee on the Sociology of Law, International Sociological Association, Amsterdam,
June 1991) ("Seekings, 'Visions' "). Heribert Adam, in the course of a wide-ranging analysis of
the mechanisms by which South Africa's white rulers sought to retain power despite lacking
legitimacy, suggests another phenomenon that might promote conservatism. As he puts it,
"what Marx calls the 'dull compulsion of circumstances'" can blunt people's awareness of the
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Indeed, many Africans seem to have disengaged from "politics" as
such-a reasonable stance for them to take, given how thoroughly they
were excluded from lawful exercise of political power. According to Markinor's 1981 poll, 51% of the Africans surveyed said that they were not interested in politics at all (or didn't know how much interest they had), and
49% said that they never discussed politics. 1°6 Many Africans, moreover,
have found spiritual meaning in the Zion Christian Church, a church whose
emphatic focus on hard work and sober moderation, rather than political
change, made it the object of favorable attention from the leaders of
apartheid. 10 7 As one perceptive journalist has written:
Obscured by the revolutionary images, the great secret is that the majority of black South Africans are deeply conservative people. It's not
that they are content to be governed by white men but that they are
wary of sudden change, that they are devoutly religious, that they find
solace in land and family and tradition, that they are intensely respectful of authority. The silent majority craves stability as much as opportunity, and more than it craves justice.108
Men and women so moderate are not friends of apartheid. But they
may not make the leap of delegitimation that many observers assumed was
inevitable, from dislike of apartheid to condemnation of all its institutions.
Moreover, they may be reluctant to conclude, even after being the victims
possibility of alternatives to their existing situation. Adam, "Compliance" at 176 (cited in
note 7). One such circumstance is sheer economic dependence, and Adam notes that for
Africans this dependence is embodied in the fact that as of 1983 almost one fifth of all
employed Africans worked for the state. Id. at 177-78.
106. Marldnor 1981 at 85 (cited in note 51). Whites were considerably more interested
in politics, according to this survey, while Coloureds' views resembled those of Africans, and
Asians' disinterest was even more intense. Id. Tom Rikhoto, the litigant in the important pass
law case, Oos-Randse Administrasieraad v. Rikhoto, 1983 (3) SA 584 (A), is an example of
an African man who both considered apartheid a bad system and considered himself unpolitical. Though acutely aware of the sufferings caused by the pass law system, Mr. Rikhoto described himself as nonpolitical at the time he brought his case; in his words, "I was nothing on
that time .... [I] did not know exactly for this politics or that exactly." Interview with
Mehlolo Tom Rikhoto (Rikhotso), 1 Nov. 1994, transcript at 11. This interview took place in
Mr. Rikhoto's residence in a Johannesburg suburb.
Interestingly, by 1990 Africans' interest in politics appeared to have risen considerably.
See Markinor 1990 at 138 (cited in note 56). In 1990, moreover, urban Africans were more
likely than any other group polled to believe that they could "do a great deal" about an unjust
law; 21% of urban Africans held this view, compared with just 8% of South Africans as a
whole. Id. at 154. This is a remarkable indication of Africans' optimism about the prospects
for change in South Africa-optimism that proved well-founded. Yet African confidence in
the legal system was higher in 1990 than in 1981 (see text at notes 64-68 supra). Thus it
would seem that if political disengagement was connected to the considerable degree of confidence Africans expressed in 1981, other factors were able to sustain even greater confidence
in 1990.
107. Bill Keller, "A Surprising Silent Majority in South Africa," N.Y. Tmes Mag., 17
April 1994, at 34.
108. Id. at 37.
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of injustice at the hands of some officials or institutions, that all similar
officials or institutions deserve contempt. These refusals to generalize may
be very important to the makeup of South African opinion on the legal
system.
Consider Jon Qwelane's statement, which I have heard echoed more
than once, that "I am certain that none of the 19 million people whom the
courts sent to prison under the Pass Laws will ever sing praises about the
'fine and proud traditions' of the judiciary."'19 It would be hard to overstate
the injustices of the pass law system. But did Africans view this system as
the true essence of their legal system?" 0 One veteran white critic of South
African law commented to me that his pass court clients could and did
evaluate and approve of other aspects of the courts' functioning even as
they disapproved of the operation of the pass laws. An African lawyer,
Thandi Orleyn, commented that many Africans didn't have a great deal of
trouble with the pass laws."' She went on to say that, in Johannesburg in
particular, the pass courts were in a separate building; by contrast, "when
you walked to the Supreme Court for instance then you would see more
people, you would see reporters, you'd see the more liberal people, who
would be seen, even if they were white, as being in favor of the African
' 12
oppressed person."
It seems possible, moreover, that Africans disposed to view South African institutions with considerable tolerance would have found it easier to
do so in the case of the courts because of their fairly limited contact with
them. There is evidence in the United States that familiarity with the various actors in the legal system breeds discontent.1 3 Perhaps the same mechanism is at work in South Africa. Presumably Africans' principal contacts
with South Africa's legal apparatus have been with the police rather than
with the courts. Moreover, their principal contacts with the courts would
have been with the lower courts, such as the pass courts and the magistrates'
courts, rather than with the higher courts-the Supreme Courts-or the
court of last resort, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. And their
109. Qwelane, "Communities" at 4 (cited in note 31).
110. I am grateful to Howard Venable for emphasizing this issue.
111. Interview with Thandi Orleyn, 10 Nov. 1994, transcript at 5. Ms. Orleyn is the
director of the Johannesburg office of the Legal Resources Centre, a leading public interest
law organization in South Africa.
112. Id. Such aspects of the courtroom scene might be very important to the overall
impact of exposure to the legal process. Cf. Sally Engle Merry, "Courts as Performances: Domestic Violence Hearings in a Hawai'i Family Court," in Lazarus-Black & Hirsch, Contested
States 35, 37 (cited in note 14) (emphasizing the "ritual demarcation of space, costume, and
language" in the courts).
Probably many Africans were also prepared to differentiate among police. Thus Tom
Rikhoto distinguished between police officers who were just doing their job, and who "just
want to live and the children... must eat," and others who "you can see it's like not a person
like you." Rikhoto interview, 1 Nov. 1994, transcript at 9.
113. See Austin Sarat, "Studying American Legal Culture: An Assessment of Survey
Evidence," 11 Law & Soc'y Rev. 427, 439 (1977).
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knowledge of these higher courts would surely have been modest, for one of
the results of the oppression under which Africans have lived is that their
knowledge of the details of many of the issues and institutions of South
14
African life is often limited.
While the pass courts were undoubtedly the focus of great resentment
and the magistrates' courts may also have been widely criticized, Africans
might have viewed the more distant higher courts with greater approval.
This stance would have been all the easier to take if the information they
did have made the higher courts appear to be, as Ms. Orleyn's comment
suggests, the province of powerful-and somewhat sympathetic-whites.
Thus Tom Rikhoto explained his confidence that the Appellate Division
would uphold the lower court ruling in his favor in part on the ground that
"Johannesburg is just a town but there... there was not the law. And...
the Transvaal it was a territory. But all the laws it was from Bloemfontein,"
the site of the Appellate Division. Bloemfontein was, for Mr. Rikhoto, like
the "head office for the whole South Africa." 5 For Africans of this temper,
the comparative virtues of the more distant courts might have substantially
affected their assessments of the "legal system" as a whole, even though
their day-to-day experience of the law may have been much less benign.
This perspective may help us to understand the responses of Africans
to questions on their support for policies that would directly affect the legal
system. In a recent survey 52% of Africans stated that people like them
would "demand" that immediately "[bilacks be appointed as magistrates and
judges instead of whites." 6 This answer reflects strong feelings on this issue-feelings that are entirely understandable in light of the virtually all114. This observation, condescending as it may sound, is not meant that way; it reflects
the findings of polltakers of varying political orientations and appears to reflect a reality of
public opinion throughout the underdeveloped world. See Orkin, "Politics" at 88 (cited in
note 60); see also Schlemmer, 3 (4) IndicatorSA at 4 (cited in note 104) (finding "very little
evidence of a consistent ideological paradigm [among African workers] ... as one would no
doubt expect among poorly educated workers").
This reality goes a long way to explain the sometimes very high numbers of Africans who
respond to public opinion polls by saying that they do not have an opinion on the matter at
issue. For example, "some 40% of respondents [apparently all Africans] across the country had
not heard of the issue" of economic sanctions against South Africa before being polled about
it in the mid-1980s. Orkin, "Politics" at 88. Respondents' suspicion of and unfamiliarity with
the process of public opinion polling can also obscure their opinions; it appears, e.g., that over
40% of rural African respondents in Orkin's study declined to answer a question concerning
their political allegiance. Id. at 94.
115. Rikhoto interview, 1 Nov. 1994, transcript at 14-16.
116. See Lawrence Schlemmer, "Conflict in the New South Africa: Class, Culture and
Power," Info. Update, Dec. 1992, at 4, 5. In this survey, respondents were presented with
various possible actions a new government might take and asked whether "people like you"
"will demand it immediately and not be satisfied without it," "would like it but not at once,"
"would not like it," or "will oppose it and try to prevent it." In my description of this survey, I
rely primarily not on Schlemmer's article but on the text of the survey and a detailed breakdown of the answers, apparently separately published and kindly provided to me by Ian
Hirschfeld of the HSRC. I cite this material hereafter as "Conflict Survey Materials."
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white character of the South African judiciary until now.1 17 But it is striking
that Africans were even more likely to mention housing opportunities, free
schooling, and desegregated schooling as demands." 8 They were also more
likely to rate "blacks being appointed to good jobs instead of whites wherever possible" as a demand than to give this label to the appointment of
blacks as judges and magistrates. 1 9 Moreover, the call for blacks to be "appointed as magistrates and judges instead of whites," though not without its
ambiguities, seems decidedly more modest than the proposal that blacks be
"put in charge of the police and army." In response to the latter suggestion,
which put black control, not just black appointments, at issue, only 35% of
120
the African respondents said that people like them would demand it.
Probably much of this forbearance is simply a result of Africans' pragmatic
conclusions that they need other changes more urgently. Yet it seems reasonable to say, as well, that many Africans evaluated the need for changes
in their legal system with a considerable degree of moderation, and that this
evaluation is consistent with the inference that they saw some measure of
12
virtue in the system as it stood. '
2.

Day-to-Day Concerns as Sources of African Legitimation: The
Issue of Crime Control

Given the considerable conservatism of African opinion, it is not
strange that many Africans would be concerned with an issue so prosaic and
117. Now, in 1995, there are about 10 black judges, permanent or acting, on the
Supreme Courts (whose various divisions roughly correspond to the federal judiciary in the
United States), but most of these have probably only been appointed since the nonracial
elections of last year. Two other black Supreme Court judges have been elevated to the new
Constitutional Court. South Africa's next tier of courts is presided over by magistrates; as of
1991 there were 28 black magistrates out of a total of 1014. Desir~e Hansson, "Selected Statistics on the South African Criminal Justice System," 1992 S. Aft. C0im. Just. 317, 325. The
proportion of black magistrates has since increased, however, with the incorporation of the
magistracies of the four putatively independent African homelands after they were formally
reunited with South Africa. African traditional leaders or chiefs continue to exercise a
subordinate jurisdiction within their own ethnic groups.
118. Of Africans surveyed, 70.77% rated "white schools having to accept all black children who wish to attend" a demand; 69.74% said people like them would demand "free
schooling for all children"; and 63.74% described "housing opportunities for poor black people
in places where they choose to live, even if close to white areas," as a demand. "Conflict
Survey Materials."
119. Of Africans, 61.37% viewed such appointments to "good jobs" as a demand. Id.
120. Of Africans, 26.52% said people like them "would not like" this policy, and another 3.16% said people like them would "oppose it and try to prevent it'!
Id. On the question
of appointment of blacks as magistrates and judges, 12.69% said people like them would not
like it and 3.55% said people like them would oppose it and try to prevent it. Id.
-121. Lawrence Schlemmer comments that on the issue of appointments to the judiciary
"many blacks are not insistent on quick results." Schlemmer, Info. Update, Dec. 1992, at 6
(cited in note 116). Nonetheless he ranks this issue as the 6th highest, out of 24, in his listing
of issues with "conflict potential," because the substantial African demand for it confronts
sharp white- resistance. Id.
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even "counterrevolutionary" as crime control. This concern becomes even
more readily understandable in light of the facts about crime in South Africa. South Africa is a very dangerous country. Political violence, particularly in the last years of apartheid, has taken many thousands of lives.
Nonpolitical violence has taken even more. In fact, South Africa's murder
rate is one of the highest in the world-perhaps five times higher than that
of the United States. 122 Its rate of rapes may be the highest in the world. 123
A great deal of South African crime is committed by Africans, a fact that
reflects both widespread economic deprivation and, in all likelihood, the
illegitimacy of South African law in the eyes of many, especially young,
Africans. But Africans themselves appear to be the principal victims of
South African crime. 24 They are also the people most in need of police
protection in South Africa, and most in need of whatever impact courts can
make on the problem of crime. 125 For a number of crimes, including murder,
rape, and aggravated and common assault, the bulk of the cases heard in the
122. A recent newspaper article reports that South Africa has "an estimated 20,000 killings each year." Keith B. Richburg, "S. Africans Struggle to Cope with a 'Society in Stress';
Violence Creates a Heavy Mental Health Burden," Washington Post, 4 Sept. 1993 (available
on NEXIS). In 1991, according to official statistics, there were 14,693 reports of murder.
Hansson, 1992 S. Afr. Crim. Just. at 323. Most of these murders are not political; in 1991, for
example, there were about 2,840 "[d]eaths as a result of political conflict in South Africa." Id.
at 318. With a population estimated at 42,793,000 (see U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical
Abstract of the United States: 1993 at 841, table 1374 (1993)), 20,000 annual killings in South
Africa would represent a homicide rate of 46.7 per 100,000 people. The rate in the United
States in 1993 was 9.5 per 100,000. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports for
the United States 1993 at 13 (1994).
123. According to official statistics, there were 22,765 reports of rape and attempted
rape in 1991. Hansson, 1992 S. Aft. Crim. Just. at 323. According to one calculation, in 1989
South Africa had almost 65 rapes per 100,000 people;.the United States rate in 1988 was 37.6
per 100,000. Howard Witt, "S. Africa Takes on Tone of Wild West," Chicago Tribune, 19
March 1990 (available on NEXIS). There have been charges that the true rate in South
Africa is even higher. Chris Erasmus, "Statistics Show Nation Is Armed, Dangerous," Gannett
News Service, 14 Dec. 1991 (available on NEXIS).
124. In 1991, 2,681 people were convicted of murder in South Africa.. Of these, 2,577
were black. Of the victims, 2,510 were black. Hansson, 1992 S. Aft. Crim. Just. at 323 n.68.
(Whites appear to have been more likely-at least in the eyes of the law-to commit, or to
suffer, "culpable homicide," a lesser offense. In 1991, 3,051 people were convicted of culpable
homicide, including 1,642 blacks; 1,640 of the victims were black. Id. at n.69.) In the same
year, 4,661 people were convicted of rape or attempted rape; 4,496 of them were black and
4,418 of the victims were black as well. Id. at n.72. The great majority of those convicted of
aggravated assault and common assault, and of their victims, also appear to have been black.
Id. at nn.70, 71. This pattern dissolves, not surprisingly, with the crime of housebreaking,
though even here many convictions are obtained in cases where blacks were victimized; of
35,930 convictions for this offense in 1991, 15,606 involved whites' residences, 8,989 blacks'
residences and 10,956 "business and state premises." Id. at 324 n.84.
125. In one study, based on personal interviews with about 1,954 Africans in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) area, a heavily urban region, only 17.7% of Africans
surveyed said that they felt very safe, or fairly safe, alone at night in their neighborhood. In
contrast, 36.9% of Coloureds, 51.8% of Indians, and 67.6% of whites felt these levels of safety.
Rita Esterhuysen (Senior Researcher), Perceptions of and Attitudes toward Crime, the Law and
Components of the CriminalJustice System: A Comparison between Groups 15 (Human Sciences
Research Council, 1984) ("PWV Study"). (This study is in Afrikaans; I rely on excerpts very
kindly translated for me by Dr. Lorraine Glanz.)
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South African courts appear to involve African victims (and African
perpetrators).
As a result, it is quite clear that many, if not most, Africans do take the
issue of crime very seriously indeed. In Markinor's 1981 poll, more urban
Africans (46%) said that "maintaining order" should be the aim of the
country than chose any other option, including "giving the people more say
in important governmental decisions."'1 26 That result no doubt reflected
Africans' understanding that there was very little they could realistically
hope to get from the government of that day. Even in 1990, however, when
urban Africans placed democratization and the economy ahead of law and
order, 127 51% named a law and order concern as one of the two most important goals for the country. 28 Africans themselves express dissatisfaction
over the protection they receive, 129 and many endorse harsh measures to try
130
to stem the disorder from which they suffer.
126. Markinor 1981 at 88 (cited in note 51). Only 29% of urban Africans polled said
that "giving the people more say" should be the aim of the country. Id.
127. Marldnor 1990 at 147 (cited in note 56).
128. Id. at 150. I follow Markinor 1990 at 148, in including support for a strong defense
force as a law and order position; South Africa's military has played a significant domestic
role.
129. In surveys in 1983 and 1988, only 31% and 35% of Africans, respectively, said they
were satisfied, or very satisfied, with "security against crime." Moller, 7 (1) IndicatorSA at 44
(cited in note 20). Similarly, according to a report in 1990, "[a] recent survey by Natal University said 35% of blacks feel they have little or no protection against crime." Rodney Pinder,
"Tourist Killing Fuels Fear of Jungle Law in South Africa," Reuter Newswire Africa (31 Oct.
1990) (available on WESTLAW). In another survey, conducted in January 1988 and consisting of interviews with 677 adults in KwaMashu and Umlazi, 35.3% of the respondents felt
that "your local police" were "doing a good job.., of maintaining law and order," and 21.4%
felt the police were doing an "average job"; 31.2% felt the police were doing a "poor job."
KwaMashu/Umlazi Study at 189, 222 (cited in note 90). In the same survey, 43.3% felt there
were not enough policemen active in their area, somewhat more than felt either that the
number of police was about right (25.3%), or that it was too large (16.2%). Id. at 223. In still
another survey, 85.5% of Africans surveyed in the PWV region agreed or strongly agreed that
"[t]he law ought to prevent crime more effectively," while just 31.0% felt that the South
African Police were doing "well" or "very well" in maintaining law and order. PWV Study at
23, 34 (cited in note 125).
130. In a November 1992 survey of 100 Africans in the Natal areas of Umlazi and Clermont, 60% or more of the respondents endorsed the death penalty for "shooting," "stabbing,"
murder and rape. Daniel Nina & Stavros Stavrou, Research on Perceptions of Justice: Interaction
between State Justice and PopularJustice (Durban, April 1993) ("Nina & Stavrou, Research on
Perceptions"). A more recent national poll (perhaps only of urban or metropolitan residents)
similarly finds that 49% of blacks support retention of the death penalty, while 34% support
abolition and 17% "abstained." See "White South Africans Want Death Penalty Retained,"
Agence France Presse, 4 April 1995 (available on LEXIS). This support for the death penalty
is particularly startling because both Inkatha and the African National Congress had proposed
to prohibit capital punishment in a future South Africa. See Constitutional Committee of the
African National Congress, ANC Draft Bill of Rights art. 2(3) (Preliminary Rev. Version, Feb.
1993); The [Proposed] Constitution of the State of KwaZulu/Natal art. 18(a) (n.d.; released Dec.
1992).
In the KwaMashu/Umlazi study (at 223), 38.5% of the respondents felt that on the
whole criminal sentences were too lenient; 30.7% viewed them as about right; and only
11.0% saw them as too severe. A modest plurality of the respondents (32.3%) also felt that
the local police were "on the whole ... too lenient.., in their actions against suspects"
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In parts of South Africa, where relations between police and community have collapsed, the need for some sort of order presses Africans to accept the authority of often arbitrary people's courts or similar entities. Bill
Keller of the New York Times reported in 1993 on a chilling example of this
breakdown of formal law and order. Keller recounts the story of a woman
who told "township vigilantes," after one of them announced their intention to "discipline" her son, that "[tihe one thing I won't stand for, I don't
want fire on my son. You can kill him, but do not bum him." In fact her son
was hacked and burnt to death. Keller comments:
In Tembisa, as in many black townships where the police are regarded as an indifferent force, if not hostile, de facto law enforcement
consists of a network of street committees loosely aligned with the African National Congress. They may intervene in anything from a domestic squabble to a killing.
The committees are nominally run by adults, but in practice it is
the swaggering teen-agers who hold the balance of power.
Often it is hard to distinguish between the vigilantes and the outlaws, since both carry guns, salute one another as "comrade" and mimic
the rituals of justice.
But Mrs. Mphahlele [the mother of the victim] respects the system
for the limited protection it affords her and because, unlike 13the whiterun Government, it is a system in which she has standing. '

(emphasis in original); 28.7% felt the police treatment of suspects was "just about right," and
21.9% felt the police were on the whole "too strict." Id. at 222.
Similarly, in the PWV Study (at 23), 86.4% of Africans agreed or strongly agreed that
"[tihere would be less crime if our laws were stricter"; 40.9% believed that in general the
police were too lenient with offenders, while only 18.0% saw the police as too harsh (at 35);
46.7% agreed or strongly agreed that the death penalty was "the best preventive measure
against crime" (at 43); and 63.9% felt that living conditions in prisons should be made more
difficult (at 61). (At the same time, however, 51.6% believed that fines should be used more
often instead of imprisonment, and 56.1% also felt that community service orders should
more often replace imprisonment (at 44-45); in a similar vein, 53.6% felt that the emphasis
in sentencing should be on rehabilitation, rather than either on punishment or on a mix of
punishment and rehabilitation (at 61). The seeming inconsistencies between these sentiments and the more punitive responses noted earlier raise some doubts about the meaning of
this survey's results.)
131. Bill Keller, "A Short, Violent Life in South Africa," N.Y. T/imes, 17 Nov. 1993, at
A3. Another account reports a survey finding that "nearly 79 percent of the residents of
Mamelodi saw neighbourhood vigilantes as the best solution to the problem of violent crime
in the community." John Hund & Malebo Kotu.Rammopo, "Justice in a South African
Township: The Sociology of Makgotda," 16 Comp. & Int'l L.. S. Aft. 179, 181 (1983), citing
R. K. Mabusela, ed., Mamelodi: Progressin Community Work 21 (National Institute for Crime
Prevention and the Rehabilitation of Offenders, 1980). Hund and Kotu-Rammopo observe
(at 181) that the "main duties [of the police in this township] appear to be confined to
protecting the property of the administration board, enforcing influx control laws, and allegedly offering protection services to the operators of illegal shebeens or taverns with whom it is
reported they act as collaborators."
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But surveys suggest that despite their deep distrust for the formally constituted authorities, many Africans continue to resort to them, at least in
cases of serious nonpolitical crime. The most striking evidence of this comes
from a "perception study" done in the area of Pietermaritzburg, a region. in
South Africa racked by especially ferocious conflict between supporters of
13 2
the African National Congress and adherents of the Inkatha movement.
In this conflict, the police were seen as blatantly biased in favor of Inkatha. 33 More than 60% of the people interviewed characterized the police
as "hostile and aggressive" or "indifferent and remote."'134 When asked to
characterize the work of the police on nonpolitical crimes, however, 38.8%
called it good or excellent and another 23.1% considered it "average." 135
Moreover, despite their sometimes harsh assessments of the police, 66% of
the people polled reported that they had in the past "laid charges at their
nearest police stations on a variety of complaints," and 66.5% "said they
would readily and willingly report an incident or lay a complaint at a police
station."'1 36 The author of the study comments: "This willingness on the part
of respondents to approach the police for help is to be welcomed in view of
132. Saras Jagwanth, "Policing of the Conflict in the Greater Pietermaritzburg Area: A
Perception Study," 9 S. Afr. J. Hum. Rrs. 536 (1992). This study was based on personal interviews, conducted in Zulu, with 364 people. Slightly over half were ANC supporters, and just
over a fifth were affiliated with Inkatha. All those interviewed lived in two areas, one "ANC
dominated," the other of mixed politics. The researchers' efforts to interview people in a
third, Inkatha-dominated area were rebuffed by the local authorities. Id. at 537-39.
133. For a stark account of the conflicts around Pietermaritzburg, an account which
essentially agrees with this perception of police bias, see Matthew Kentridge, An Unofficial
War: Inside the Conflict in Pietennaritzburg(1990). In the Pietermaritzburg perception study,
71.2% of the people interviewed felt the police had displayed partiality; only among supporters of Inkatha-widely viewed as the beneficiaries of this partiality-did a majority (55.3%)
view the police as impartial. Jagwanth, 9 S. Aft. Hum. Rts. at 546.
134. Id. at 550. ANC supporters were the most critical, Inkatha supporters the least. Id.
135. Id. at 549. Of those interviewed, 4.7% rated the police as excellent, 34.1% as good,
23.1% as average, 32.4% as poor, and 5.8% answered that they didn't know. Id The meaning
of the "average" rating is ambiguous, but in the context of the other choices offered to the
respondents it seems plausible to understand "average" as meaning roughly the same as
"adequate."

In another question, respondents were asked to rate a number of different police agencies
on a 1-5 scale, with I defined as "very good," 2 as "good," 3 as "average," 4 as "poor," and 5 as
"very poor." Of those interviewed, 47.7% rated the South African Police as below average
("4" or "5"); 59.6% so evaluated the KwaZulu Police; and 62.4% expressed this view of the
"kitskonstabels" (particularly poorly trained police used in black communities). But only
30.9% took so bleak a view of the "municipal police," and just 29.7% so evaluated the South
African Defence Force or SADF (that is, the army); 41% saw the SADF as "very good" or
"good." Id. at 553. The author of this report seems hesitant about the meaning of these responses and says that the data are "used principally for comparative purposes." Id. But the
respondents' answers seem to entail not just a belief that the SADF, in particular, was less bad
than other "law enforcement" agencies-certainly an understandable comparative assessment-but also, and perhaps more surprisingly, that the SADF was quite "good."
136. Id. at 551. A related table suggests, however, that the respondents affirmed that
they were "willing to approach the police for assistance"-not as enthusiastic a statement as
that they would "readily and willingly report an incident or lay a complaint at a police station." Id. at 552.
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the warnings by many academic writers as well as community members that
'137
the lack of confidence in the police will lead to self-help and anarchy.
It might be objected that resort to the police is no indication of any
belief in the legitimacy of the police or of the larger legal system. In Tom
Tyler's careful survey research study of legitimacy in Chicago, the "primary
determinant" of whether people said they would go to the police or to court
to resolve problems was their evaluation of the authorities' performance. "In
38
contrast, the legitimacy of the authorities had only a minor influence.'
Moreover, it might be argued that Africans' desire for crime control is not
enough to persuade them to accord legitimacy to an unjust system. In the
words of Don Nkadimeng, a lawyer, law teacher, and leader of a radical
black political group, the Azanian People's Organization, "I would imagine
that what black people want here is what people everywhere else want ....
39
They want order.., but they don't want order at the expense of justice."'
Strong as pragmatic explanations are, there is some reason to believe
that they do not fully capture Africans' responses to their legal system on
the question of crime control. To be sure, the pragmatic calculations favoring resort to the state's law enforcement system may be compelling, for
although the state no longer has a monopoly on the instruments of force in
South Africa, it does have by far the most elaborate apparatus for the control of crime. The importance of such practical calculations is suggested by a
survey of 100 Africans in two townships near the city of Durban. 14° In this
study, respondents were asked which legal authorities they would take various crimes to. Of the respondents, 60-70% said that they would take murder, shooting, rape, burglary, and robbery to the police rather than to a
variety of other possible entities. 141 Only on three offenses, physical assault,
domestic violence, and witchcraft, did the respondents identify community
137. Id. at 553. For even more explicitly positive views of the police, expressed by African youth in a nationwide survey, see text at note 91 supra.
138. Tyler, Why Obey Law 239-40 n.7 (cited in note 11); see Sarat, 11 Law & Soc'y
Rev. at 5 (cited in note 113).
139. Interview with Don Nkadimeng, 2 Nov. 1994, transcript at 17. A number of black
lawyers with whom I spoke, though not all, found this "crime control" theory of legitimation
unlikely. Thus Mahomed Navsa, an advocate at the Legal Resources Centre in Johannesburg
who headed the LRC's constitutional litigation unit, responded that "levels of resistance
would never have escalated to the point that they did" if this theory were correct. He further
argued that it would have been extremely hard for people to adopt the stance of seeing the
system as helpfully controlling others, since "it was such an all-pervasive system which cut
across everyone's lives, if you were African, it touched you, you couldn't escape it." Interview
with Mahomed Navsa, 7 Nov. 1994, transcript at 11. Even so, the grounds for inferring that
such thinking did find a place among "conservative" Africans seem to me to be persuasive.
140. Nina & Stavrou, Research on Perceptions (cited in note 130).
141. In addition, 59% would have taken theft to the police, and 49% would have taken
"stabbing." Id. at 9, 22-27. In contrast, Hund and Kotu-Rammopo, 16 Comp. & Int'l LJ. S.
Afr. at 183 (cited in note 131) comment: "Although we have no reliable survey data on the
matter, it seems clear that the vast majority of blacks living in townships do not turn to the
official court structure for help in processing their claims or for redressing their grievances."
Perhaps violent crimes are an exception to this generalization, or perhaps Hund and Kotu-
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groups or people as their preferred choice.1 42 Whatever their choices, however, the reasons the respondents offered for their choices seem to have
been very pragmatic.1 43 Certainly their choices did not come primarily from
a belief in the fairness of South African law; over two-thirds believed that
the laws enforced by the police were unfair, at least under certain circumstances, and over half held the same view of the laws enforced by the
magistrate. 44
This same survey implies, however, that Africans might also recognize
a measure of legitimacy in the legal system. According to the survey,
"[riespondents were asked to list what organization, authority, groups of people or individuals are symbols of the judicial system. No limit was imposed
on the number of responses allowed from individuals."' 45 This question is
very ambiguous; one might imagine, for example, that it would only elicit
the respondents' understanding of what the current system of justice consisted of, rather than any hint of their views of whether justice was actually
being done in that system. But the respondents' answers, as set out in table
3, seem to reflect some flavor of evaluation as well as description, and if
that inference is correct, then it is striking that the respondents felt as disposed as they did to name elements of the current legal system as symbols of
the judicial system or justice.
In this survey respondents were also asked whether each of a series of
entities had "the right to enforce the law and protect the people." Again,
the meaning of the question is ambiguous; perhaps those who answered it
felt they were being asked to make a moral judgment, or perhaps they felt
they were being asked for a statement of positive law. Clearly at least some
respondents took moral considerations into account, however, for some answered not that the body in question did or did not have the right to enforce the law, but that it should. Table 4 presents the responses, combining
those who answered that a given body did have this right and those who
said that it should have the right.
Rammopo's observation is unqualifiedly true in some areas-Tembisa, for example (see text
at note 131)-and not in others.
142. Nina & Stavrou, Research on Perceptions 11-12. Only 27% would have reported
physical assault to the police, just 6%would have reported domestic violence, and 3% would
have reported witchcraft. Id.at 24, 25, 27.
143. Id. at 11, 22-27.
144. Id. at 34. The distinction in assessments of the laws enforced by the police and
those enforced by the magistrate is intriguing, since presumably the laws in question were
actually the same. The difference in perception, then, seems to be the result of a difference in
assessment of the enforcing agency, and so we can conclude that these 100 survey respondents
had a modestly more charitable view of the fairness of the courts than they did of the police.
This finding echoes the distinctions drawn by Africans nationwide, as discussed earlier. See
text at notes 73-75 supra.
145. Id. at 8. It appears that the actual question was slightly different from this paraphrase and asked "what kind of symbols represent justice," rather than what symbols represented the "judicial system." Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
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TABLE 3
What Kind of Symbols Represent Justice?
Symbol

Response (%)

Courts
Police
Civic associations
Lawyers
People's marshals
Judges
People's courts
Tribal authorities
Warlords
Other

72
64
60
54
53
49
37
32
16
13

SOURCE: Nina & Stavrou, Research on Perceptions 8 (cited in note 130).

TABLE 4
Authorities with the Right to Enforce the Law
Authority
Police
Lawyers
Magistrates/courts
Civic associations
Tribal authorities
People's courts
Warlords
SOURCE:

Has Right (%)

Has No Right (%)

84
83
81
70
64
58
11

16
17
19
30
36
42
88

Nina & Stavrou, Research on Perceptions 12 (cited in note 130).

These answers suggest, albeit ambiguously, that Africans who saw great
unfairness in their legal system nonetheless still saw that system as linked to
justice, both symbolically and in terms of its entitlement (positive or moral)
to enforce the law. Some flavor of legitimacy, I suggest, emerges from these
responses and helps to support the inference that Africans' acute need for
law enforcement still provides them with a basis not just for using the legal
system but also for modestly legitimizing it. Other studies as well have elicited a similar, puzzling mixture of positive and negative assessments by Afri-

cans of the justice of their courts, in particular with respect to crime. 146 The
146. The respondents in the 1988 KwaMashu/Umlazi Study (cited in note 90) also offered striking illustrations of the approval that some black South Africans accord to their legal
system. Of those surveyed, 62.6% agreed that "[the law punishes trespassers and protects lawabiding people"; only 14.4% disagreed, while 23.0% were "neutral." Id. at 225. Similarly,
40.9% agreed that "[in this country nobody will be sentenced to prison without good reason";
30.9% disagreed, while 28.2 % were neutral. And 40.0% denied that "[the police arrest many
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ambivalence of these assessments certainly should not be ignored, but it
would equally be a mistake to disregard only the positive evaluations that
Africans offer. This very ambivalence seems well captured in the idea that
7
Africans are according their legal system a measure of legitimacy.14
innocent people," while only 28.3% agreed with this statement, and 21.8% were neutral. Id.
at 224.
These respondents may have been unusually conservative in their general orientation,
but these suggestions of legitimacy cannot simply be written off as aberrations, for in response
to other questions some of these same respondents demonstrated that they were capable of
considerable cynicism about the legal system. 42.2% agreed that "[plolice officers do not care
what happens to you after you have been arrested," and 38.5% were neutral; only 19.3%
disagreed. Only 30.8% agreed that "[m]agistrates are honest and kind-hearted" (44.8% were
neutral and 24.4% disagreed); similarly, only 29.3% agreed that "[in the courts all people are
treated justly" (43.3% were neutral and 27.4% disagreed). Id. Finally, and in the same vein,
only 24.6% agreed that "[c]ourt verdicts are always just," while 48.2% were neutral and 27.2%
disagreed. Id. at 225. Even these levels of approval are startling to an outside observer, and
remind us of just how conservative some African opinion is. (The large percentages expressing
neutrality, however, are puzzling; were these respondents simply unsure, see id. at 205, or were
they being discreet?) Perhaps more important, however, some of these respondents were evidently able to combine skepticism or reserve about the courts and the police with some measure of what appears to be respect for them. The resulting answers are not always mutually
inconsistent, and, when they are, some part of the explanation may lie in respondents' misunderstanding of the questions or strategic responses to them. But it seems reasonable to infer
that another part reflects actual ambivalence and to remember that legitimation can be ambivalent, and yet still exist.
So, too, in another survey, 59.6% of Africans agreed or strongly agreed that "[a]ll are
equal in the eyes of the law," 48.7% that "[aill
people are treated fairly by the courts," 60.2%
that "[n]o one will be sent to prison in this country without good reason," 48.0% that
"[mlagistrates are honest and compassionate," and 55.4% that "[c]ourt judgments are always
just." PWV Study at 23, 41, 42 (cited in note 125). At the same time, 52.1% believed that
"Im]any people in prison are actually not guilty of the crime for which they are being punished." Id. at 42.
Finally, in a survey of youth attitudes by the liberal agency CASE, polling found that a
small fraction of young people of all races-between a tenth and a fifth-believed that people sent to prison for crimes of fraud, assault and rape were "victims of the system." (African
youth were not more likely, and with respect to fraud were actually less likely, to hold these
views than were young people of other groups.) Everatt, "A Violent Generation?" at 1-2
(cited in note 91). Though this brief summary of the poll's findings does not spell the point
out, it would appear that a greater fraction of young people of all races must have expressed
contrary views.
147. One further indication that Africans in South Africa are taking legitimacy into
account in their use of the police is the admittedly scanty evidence from some of these same
surveys that Africans did acknowledge an obligation to obey the law. In the PWV Study at
24, 47.7% of the Africans surveyed agreed or strongly agreed that "[t]he law should be obeyed
at-all times," though 68.5% of the respondents also agreed or strongly agreed that "[a] person
need only obey those laws that seem to be reasonable." Of those surveyed, 67.4% disagreed or
disagreed strongly with the statement that "[i]t
is all right to transgress the law as long as one
does not get caught," and in the KwaMashu/Umlazi Study at 225, 82.0% disagreed with a
similar or identical proposition.
Markinor's surveys, somewhat similarly, found that although Africans did offer a degree
of approval for various illegal acts, on average they still leaned toward viewing crimes-even
such arguably political acts as political assassination, fighting with police, or "claiming state
benefits which you are not entitled to"--as unjustified. See Markinor 1981 at 78 (cited in
note 51); Marldnor 1990 at 37 (cited in note 56).
One exploratory study of predominantly African offenders (described as "juveniles"
though many were over 20), most of whom were serving sentences for violent crimes, found
that considerable portions even of this group showed some support for fidelity to the law (and
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What could account for this degree of legitimation? The fact that resort to the legal system can get some results is not irrelevant, but in his
careful study of legitimation in the United States, Why People Obey the Law,
Tom Tyler demonstrates persuasively that people's views of the legitimacy
of the legal system are affected not only by whether they get the results they
hope for in their encounters with this system but also by whether they feel
they have been treated in a fair manner by it. 148 Fairness is a matter both of
outcome and of procedure, but Tyler concludes that procedural justice is "the
key normative judgment influencing the impact of experience on legitimacy."' 49 Tyler also suggests, however, that a strategy of legitimation by
procedure cannot ultimately be successful if the actual outcomes are stubbornly unsatisfactory 50
Tyler's work, then, directs our attention to perceptions of fairness in
procedure and in results. The same factors may help resolve a debate over
Douglas Hay's well-known argument that the 18th-century English legal
system won deference by deftly mixing ferocity and elite benevolence.151 In
response to this argument, which might be described as an argument for
legitimation through seemingly fair procedures, John Langbein argued: "The
criminal law and its procedures existed to serve and protect the interests of
the people who suffered as victims of crime, people who were overwhelmingly non-elite."' 5 2 Perhaps we can understand the debate between Hay and
Langbein from this perspective: the display of elite magnanimity that Hay
sees as integral to the English criminal law may have owed its ideological
success in part to the fact that the day-to-day business of the courts provided
"non-elite" people with a measure of concrete protection and what they saw
as fair outcomes. The procedural justice of the South African legal system is
far from perfect, but this system may well have offered enough appearance,
and even reality, of fair procedure and concrete protection to earn a measure of legitimacy.
some approval of the existing legal system). For example, 59.9% disagreed with the proposition that "lilt is all right for a person to break the law as long as he doesn't get caught," and
30.3% agreed that "[the present court system treats everybody justly." However, 58.1% felt
that "[miany [ofi the people in prison are actually not criminals but victims of the system,"
and 46.1% felt that "Africans who violate the law should be punished by people's courts and
not by the present criminal justice system." Evanthe Schurink & Willem Schurink, "Addressing Crime amongst SA's Marginalised Youth," 4 (2) Info. Update 47, at 53 (1994).
148. See Tyler, Why Obey Law 94-112 (cited in note 11).
149. Id.at 162.
150. See id. at 30, 106-7, 147, 164.
151. Douglas Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law," in Douglas Hay, Peter
Linebaugh, John G.Rule, E. P. Thompson, & Cal Winslow, Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and
Society in Eighteenth-Century England 17 (1975). For a similar view of the impact of the power
of Southern slaveholders, see Eugene Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made
40 (1976).
152. John Langbein, "Albion's Fatal Flaws," Past & Present, Feb. 1983, 96, at 97.

454 LAW AND SOCIAL INQUIRY
It will not do to overstate the procedural fairness of South Africa's
courts.1 53 Until the very last years of apartheid, the judges of the highest
courts, the "Supreme Courts," were all white (and almost all male), and the
vast majority of South Africa's magistrates, who preside over the lower
courts, were white too. 154 Senior police officers would also have been entirely, or almost entirely, white. Only about a tenth of South Africa's lawyers are black. 5 5 In many, many cases black South Africans have not been
represented by counsel when they faced criminal charges, because no comprehensive system of legal aid to indigent defendants exists.' 56 Because
South Africa's official legal languages have been Afrikaans and English,
many Africans go to trial in courtrooms where they must rely on interpreters to understand the proceedings; interpreters are provided by the state, but
their sometimes troubling performance can inject a further source of unfairness into the proceedings. 57 Such racial discourtesies as referring to white
witnesses as "Mr." or "Mrs." while addressing black witnesses by their first
names may still not have died out.'5 8 And whatever the courts' claims to
procedural fairness, they are further undercut by substantive injustice-by
laws that have explicitly or effectively applied only to blacks 159 and by dis160
crimination in sentences.
For lawyers, one of the most damning charges against the fairness of
the South African courts has distinguished between the Supreme Courts
and the magistrates' courts and suggested that the latter are specially subject
to state control. This charge has considerable force, even though until the
nonracial elections of 1994 all the judges of all these courts were appointed
by the government. The difference is that judges of the Supreme Courts
153. Nor, it deserves emphasis, should we overstate the quality of the crime control
results the South African legal system delivers. Africans are poorly rather than well protected
against crime.
154. See note 117 supra.
155. See D. Mokgatle, "The Exclusion of Blacks from the South African Judicial System," 3 S. Afr. J. Hum. Rts. 44, 46 (1987).
156. In 1991, 683,641 people appeared in court "on charges of serious offense without
legal representation." Hansson, 1992 S. Aft. Crim. Just. at 326 (cited in note 117). For commentary on this problem, provoked by a decision of South Africa's highest court declining to
recognize a right to state-appointed counsel, see the articles by Dennis Davis, David McQuoid-Mason, N. C. Steytler, and J. R. Midgley & Clive Plasket, in "Focus on Rudman," 8 S.
Afr. J. Hum. Rts. 90-125 (1992).
157. See N. C. Steytler, "Implementing Language Rights in Court: The Role of the
Court Interpreter," 8 S. Aft. J. Hum. Rts. 205 (1992).
158. See C. R. M. Dlamini, "The Influence of Race on the Administration of Justice in
South Africa," 4 S. Afr. J. Hum. Rts. 37, 46 (1988).
159. With the beginning of the dismantling of apartheid, fortunately, the most egregious
of these-such as the Group Areas Act or the pass laws-were repealed. Even now, however,
facially neutral laws may have decidedly nonneutral impacts; laws seeking to stem "squatting"
by otherwise homeless people, e.g., in practice apply almost exclusively to blacks. For an early
overview of South Africa's explicitly or effectively race-based criminal legislation, see Albie
Sachs, Justice in South Africa 164-74 (1973) ("Sachs, Justice in South Africa").
160. For some glaring examples, see Dugard, Last Years 107-10 (cited in note 1).
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have been appointed almost exclusively from the ranks of advocates (barristers), in particular from among those advocates who have become "Senior
Counsel"-in short, from an elite within an elite, and moreover from an
elite whose professional culture puts a considerable premium on independence of mind. 161 Magistrates, in contrast, are civil servants, and perhaps are
much more subject to implicit or even explicit promptings by their superiors. 162 Since the magistrates handle far more cases than the judges of the
Supreme Courts, the import of this criticism is that the bulk of Africans in
63
the courts receive tainted justice.
Yet there is a case to be made for the proposition that some Africans
see the South African legal system as providing fair procedures (and fair
results). Much of African opinion, as I have already suggested, is by no
means radical, and survey evidence suggests that many Africans do in fact
see the legal system as fair. In one study, almost a quarter of the African
respondents in two KwaZulu/Natal townships agreed that "[clourt verdicts
are always just," and slightly more agreed that "[in the courts all people are
treated justly."' 6 4 In another survey, respondents were even more enthusiastic about the fairness of the courts. In this study, 55.4% of Africans agreed
or strongly agreed that "[clourt judgments are always just," 59.6% that "[a]ll
are equal in the eyes of the law," and 48.0% that "[m]agistrates are honest
165
and compassionate."
The imperfect justice of the state's courts, moreover, must be weighed
by those who assess it against the available alternatives. Africans in South
Africa have long traditions of maintaining and using judicial bodies outside
the purview of the state,166 but in recent years the most publicized (at least
in white-owned media) and the most notorious have been the "people's
courts." These institutions, conceived in struggle and initially operated with
great idealism, have shown an alarming tendency to deteriorate quickly into
quasi-criminal operations. 67 They have also been the domain of the
161. See Ellmann, Time of Trouble 212-30 (cited in note 2).
162. See id. at 226 n.325.
163. One tantalizing piece of survey research suggests, moreover, that black South Africans may have been well aware of the inferior quality of the magistrates' justice. Dennis Davis
found in "a pilot study of 100 black South African respondents living in Langa, Nyanga, and
Cape Town conducted in 1986 ... that approximately 40% of the sample considered that
they could receive a fair trial in the Supreme Court. Few, if any, felt the same of the Magistrate Courts." Davis, 18 Soc. Just. at 77 (cited in note 92).
164. See note 146 above, describing results of the KwaMashufUmlazi Study.
165. See note 146 above, describing results of the PWV Study.
166. Sandra Burman & Wilfried Schdrf, "Creating People's Justice: Street Committees
and People's Courts in a South African City," 24 Law & Soe'y Rev. 693, 695-96 (1990).
167. For a vivid case study, see id. at 721-34. "People's courts" had a radical political
aura, but more conservative political groupings may also create courts that operate in disturbingly coercive ways. For an example, see the discussion of the Vukani Vulimehlo People's
Party, in whose court "the judge-interrogator was... known by the nickname of 'satan,"' in
Hund & Kotu-Rammopo, 18 Comp. & Int'l L.J. S. Afr. at 191-93 (cited in note 131). Similarly, Jeremy Seekings has commented on the troubling features of the relatively conservative
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young-and not all Africans are young, nor are all by any means content
with the impact of youth mobilization on traditional African respect for
elders. 16s Though community justice has deep roots in African communities, and may well be an important aspiration of Africans for a postapartheid era, dissatisfaction with the forms of community justice characteristic of the past decade may have played a part in Africans' partial accept169
ance of the state's legal system.
3.

Day-to-Day Concerns as Sources of African Legitimation:
Resolving Civil Legal Problems

In describing a conservative paradigm of African thinking, I have not
meant to suggest that the substantial number of people who shared "conservative" perspectives were indifferent to the injustice of apartheid. On the
contrary, the injustice of apartheid was all around them, in the dangerous
conditions of their daily lives and in the tremendous force of economic deprivation to which they were constantly subjected. I have argued, however,
that the legal system might have gained some measure of legitimacy from its
provision of a response-poor as that response was-to the problem of
community courts, or makgoda, of Soweto, some of which, he says "earned a reputation for
arbitrary procedure, violent policing, and excessive sentences. Such practices provided ready
opportunities for vengeance rather than justice. The press were filled with reports on the
arbitrariness of makgotla, which seem to have become private and paramilitary rather than
civil and judicial institutions, operating to advance the immediate interests of their leaders."
Seekings, "Visions" at 5 (cited in note 105).
Condemnation of the people's courts is not universal. Pansy Tlakula and Tom Lediga of
the Black Lawyers Association both emphasized to me that some people's courts, but not all,
had had problems. Tlakula & Lediga interview, 7 Nov. 1994, transcript at 5 (cited in note
29).
168. See Burman & Schrf, 24 Law & Soc'y Rev. at 730-31. Hund & Kotu-Rammopo
describe a community court organized by older people in an effort to control the young, but
ultimately deprived of its means of coercion by a successful lawsuit brought in the formal court
system by one of the young people whom it had subjected to corporal punishment. Hund &
Kotu-Rammopo, 18 Comp. & Int'l LJ. S. Afr. at 185-86. More recently Hund has commented that the relations "between the youth or the 'comrades' and the 'fathers' who represent establishment values" might best be characterized as "warfare." John Hund, "Formal
Justice and Township Justice," in Hund, ed., Law and Justice in South Africa 203, 214 n.12
(1988).
169. Nina & Stavrou, Research on Perceptions 28 (cited in note 130) found evidence
both of Africans' desire for community involvement in the system of justice (67.0% believe
the community should "have a more active role in the dispensation of justice") and of Africans' dismay over the performance of the people's courts (at 8, 11-12, 15-16); see also table 3
above (respondents were twice as likely to characterize the "courts" as symbols of justice as
they were to characterize "people's courts" this way). Sandra Burman offers evidence which
suggests that in colonial days dissatisfaction with traditional systems of justice might similarly
have led some Africans to resort to the white magistrates' courts. Sandra Burman, "Symbolic
Dimensions of the Enforcement of Law," 3 (2) Brit. J.L. &fSoc'y 204, 210, 213 (1976); see
Burman & Schrd, 24 Law & Soc'y Rev. at 695. For a vivid account of vigilante justice in one
township-and a reminder that some Africans preferred this form of justice, with all its flaws,
to the state's institutions-see text at note 131 above.
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crime. It is possible that, especially after 1981, some measure of legitimacy
might also have come from the increasing availability of legal responses to
Africans' poverty and economic need.
Again, I do not mean to overstate what the law could do about the
economic suffering Africans faced. It could not do much at all. But it could
do something. An eviction might be forestalled. A pension payment might
be extracted. An employee firing might be reversed. And as the 1980s
progressed, more and more Africans would have become aware of these possibilities. Some of the victories lawyers won became the subject of media
attention. 170 Another central force in making Africans aware of the law as a
resource would likely have been the "advice centre" movement, which gathered steam in the early 1980s, and it is important to briefly take account of
this movement now.
I spoke about advice centres primarily with Thandi Orleyn, the director of the Johannesburg office of the Legal Resources Centre (LRC), and
much of the account I give here is based on that conversation. Advice centres appear to be, essentially, paralegal offices, at least some of which are
"backed up" by lawyers, who can guide the paralegals' work and take over
the more complex matters that come into the offices. But a great deal of the
work of creating the offices and staffing them has apparently been done by
activists from community, church, and student groups, rather than by lawyers. 171 It seems reasonable to infer, therefore, that potential clients who
approached these offices often understood them as having a progressive
political foundation. In any event, the number of people who used these
offices appears to have been very great. Ms. Orleyn told me that each of the
offices of the Legal Resources Centre's network sees about 10,000 people
per year. 72 The LRC's network consists of about 100 advice offices and
appears to provide a measure of coverage to many parts, though probably
not all, of the nation. 173 At 10,000 matters per office, this network of 100
advice offices may be responding to about 1,000,000 matters annually-and
1 74
there are apparently many other advice offices not linked to the LRC.
Not all the problems that clients bring to the advice centres are legal, and
not all the legal problems can be fixed. 175 But still it seems clear that the
effective reach of law was extended to many people in the black population
170. Tom Rikhoto, for example, was on television. More generally, Mahomed Navsa
observed that, especially in urban areas, "the thing was that victories were portrayed where
there weren't any before. I think there was a greater sense of being able to use the law than
before." Mr. Navsa went on to say that "I think people might have had a greater and better
appreciation for the way the courts operated and greater sense that not everything isbad, but I
think it must be qualified by the bigger picture," which he saw as decidedly bleak. Navsa
interview, 7 Nov. 1994, transcript at 12 (cited in note 139).
171. See Orleyn interview, 10 Nov. 1994, transcript at 10 (cited in note 111).
172. Id.at 7-8. This figure is a "rough estimate."
173. Id.at 8-10.
174. Ms. Orleyn mentioned an estimate of 9,000 advice centres nationwide. Id.at 7.
175. Id.at 8, 11.
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of South Africa during the 1980s. It also seems reasonable to conclude, as I
understood Ms. Orleyn did, that this movement had helped "make people
176
aware of the law and to restore some of [their] confidence" in it.
4.

The Role of Race in Legitimizing the Legal System

The South African legal system under apartheid was run by whites.
Judges, magistrates, and senior police officers were almost all white. Moreover, many Africans deeply mistrusted whites, for obvious and good reasons.1 77 Nevertheless, I was startled to hear repeated suggestions from people
I spoke to in South Africa that some Africans might have preferred the
official legal system to other possible methods of resolving disputes because
the decision makers were white. 178 Yet this is not a new observation in
South Africa. On the contrary, Stephen Biko, the "black consciousness"
leader who died in police hands in 1977, explained that it was a central
insight of black consciousness that "the black man in himself has developed
a certain state of alienation, he rejects himself precisely because he attaches
the meaning white to all that is good, in other words he equates good with
white. This arises out of his living and it arises out of his development from
179
childhood."
This preference for white decision makers could rest on such self-denigration,180 or it could arise from Africans' very practical assessments of as176. Id at 12. Ms. Orleyn may have been focusing here on a particular recent development in connection with advice centres, but I understood her to take this view more generally
as well.
177. On a 10-point scale, on which "10" meant complete trust, urban Africans' level of
trust in whites in 1990 was 3.7, according to Markinor's polling. Markinor 1990 at 173 (cited
in note 56). Apparently, their level of trust in other Africans (labeled as "blacks" in the poll)
was 5.7.
178. These comments were typically made by lawyers or organizers (most of them black)
about ordinary Africans, and it is possible that these perceptions in part reflect class and
ideological gaps between elite observers and those whom they observed-although I believe
the observers' suspicions make sense. Jotham Zwane, a rural activist, offered a contrasting
view. He emphasized that some people would say they deferred to whites and whites' courts
but that they did so because they were scared. "Mhe apartheid was very tough thing to make
a man to agree although he [does] not agree. To force him to agree [to] any things because you
can be killed and anytime." Interview with Jotham Zwane, 8 Nov. 1994, tape 2 transcript at
20. (This interview took place in Mr. Zwane's home in the Eastern Transvaal village of KwaThandeka. For a brief account of some of the remarkable events of Mr. Zwane's life of resistance to apartheid, see Geoff Budlender, "The Responsibility of Lawyers to Challenge
Injustice," 40 Cleve. St. L. Rev. 475, 475-77 (1992).)
179. Bantu Stephen Biko, testimony at the 1976 subversion trial of nine blacks linked to
the South African Students Organisation (a black consciousness group), as excerpted in Donald Woods, Biko 188 (1979). Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 & n.11
(1954), relies in part on a similar understanding of the terrible impact of American school
segregation.
180. Pansy Tlakula of the Black Lawyers Association thought it probable that some people might defer in part to the legal system because it was a white system and earlier appeared
to see force in the idea "that in this country ordinary people still regard to a very large extent
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pects of their daily life. Nomazizi Mtshotshoso, the Acting National
Director of the National Association of Democratic Lawyers, told me that
township people might prefer to have their case resolved by a magistrate
rather than by a township leader in an informal African court, because they
might "perceive [the magistrate] as someone who... hasn't got a relationship with either... party in the dispute, so in that sense they would regard
him as impartial," even while being certain that in a case involving a con81
flict between whites and blacks, the white magistrate would favor whites.
Moreover, self-denigration may shape what purports to be realistic assessment. As one unionist said to me, blacks have been taught to believe that
"whites are naturally honest to justice and the truth, but blacks get influenced by personal relations." Another described the feeling that adjudication "that is done by white people ... is done by good people. '18 2 Men and
women affected by such thinking would paradoxically find the white domi183
nation of the judiciary a virtue.
I do not at all mean to suggest that all Africans who think, in whole or
in part, in conservative terms are expressing the taint of a belief in their
own inferiority. What I have called the conservative paradigm is, again,
made up of a number of different strands of thinking. These strands can
reinforce each other, but they are not necessarily bound up with each other.
Rather, the conservative paradigm encapsulates a somewhat diverse range of
perspectives, which individually or in conjunction with each other may
contribute to support for the South African legal system. Though there is no
way to be sure, I suspect that conservative arguments such as these played a
major part in the high confidence ratings the legal system received in
1981-a time when political mobilization was blunted and Africans might
well have been focusing primarily on the quotidian concerns of ordinary life
in their communities. In the decade that ensued, other sentiments, reflected
in the paradigms of the "speakers" and the "activists," may well have gained
greater force in Africans' thinking. Yet it seems very unlikely that "conservatism" has been extinguished over these years, and entirely likely that it
has continued to play a part in Africans' assessments of the South African
legal system.

white people as being supreme." Tlakula & Lediga interview, 7 Nov. 1994, transcript at 6-7
(cited in note 29).
Even more directly, Tom Nkadimeng told me that sometimes clients in his legal practice
ask him if their legal problem seems too complicated, "Can you get me a white lawyer?"
Nkadimeng interview, 2 Nov. 1994, transcript at 19 (cited in note 139).
181. Mtshotshosa interview, 7 Nov. 1994, transcript at 4 (cited in note 30).
182. Interview with Bethuel Maserumule and Osborne Galeni of the National Union of
Metalworkers of South Africa, 10 Nov. 1994, transcript at 8. 1 believe the first quoted comment is from Mr. Maserumule and the second from Mr. Galeni.
183. This point was made to me by Mr. Maserumule. Id.
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B.

The Speakers

If conservative thinking tended to be modest in aspiration and apolitical in orientation, other Africans have long believed in their right to demand more of their government. Among Africans who held this conviction,
there may have been two somewhat different orientations, which I seek to
capture in the paradigms of "speakers" and "activists." The distinction I
have in mind is between those who believed, or hoped, that the power of
their words and their truth would convince those who heard them, and
those who understood their political efforts as aimed at bringing coercive
pressure to bear on their opponents. These two categories are not mutually
exclusive, and it may be that many or most Africans who struggled against
the state for the redress of their grievances thought in both of these ways.
But the two orientations seem different enough to deserve separate treatment; moreover, the faith that some Africans seem to have had in the legal
system needs to be explained as well as it can be. In sketching the following
description of African "speakers," I offer an explanation very much based on
inference, but an explanation which I think does help us to understand this
startling attitude. In discussing the "speakers," we must first understand better the nature of their belief in the power of words to persuade and then see
why the judicial system might have earned a measure of legitimacy as a
forum in which those words could be spoken.
The desire to speak, I suspect, had two foundations. The first was the
speakers' belief that they had rights. This belief is unremarkable in a citizen
of the United States, but it might seem much less predictable in an African
living under apartheid, a system largely designed to deprive Africans of
rights. Yet rights consciousness-the sense that one has rights' 84-has long
played a role in African challenges to apartheid. 185 The ANC's roots lay in
an essentially liberal claim for "rights for Africans within the white state." 86
187
Though developments after World War II certainly eroded this stance, I
encountered the language of rights in the words of Lucas Kgatitsoe, whose
rural people, the Magopa, had been the victims of a forced removal at the
hands of the South African state.
Mr. Kgatitsoe, a powerful speaker, deployed the language of rights in
his advocacy on behalf of his people. In a public statement he told the press
that the Magopa would return to their land whether the government ap184. See Sarat, 11 Law & Soc'y Rev. at 449 (cited in note 113).
185. Jeremy Seekings emphasized to me the important, though not exclusive, role of
rights discourse in Africans' challenges to white domination in South Africa.
186. Gail M. Gerhart, Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology 12
(1978). At 94 Gerhart emphasizes the "political and civil rights" content of the Freedom
Charter.
187. Gerhart, id. at 16, maintains that "the history of postwar African political thought
is one of a protracted process of tearing loose from liberalism as a world view."
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proved or not, because the land was their "birthright.'' 81 Similarly, in a
meeting with a government official, he asked the official to buy him an air
ticket to Cape Town to meet the cabinet and argued that "this cabinet is
the cabinet that rules my life, is the cabinet that rules South Africa. And I
am a South African. So I have the right even if the apartheid policy says it
... denies me... that right."'189
Mr. Kgatitsoe's use of these rights-based appeals must have been all the
more effective, however, because he plainly believed that he did have
rights. I asked him to explain this belief, and he told me: "I... believe that
I have the right [in this case, to organize a union] because I'm born here in
South Africa and I'm a South African." Despite the laws that denied him
rights, "I still have the right as a bona fide of this country and God placed
me in this country and I have all the rights just like anybody else. And that
is just what I say and I believe that there is no other way that I can be...
true to myself."'19 In part, this is a claim based on citizenship. It also seemed
to be based on another political point-that whites had made these unjust
laws without consulting blacks.' 9' But Mr. Kgatitsoe does not seem to be
thinking solely in political terms. In addition, he seems to be describing the
claiming of rights, or the struggle for them, as essential to his personal integrity. And he is certainly also speaking in religious terms, which he went on
to elaborate in response to my inquiry. He invoked his Christian faith to say
that "we are all created by God and we have the same rights anywhere and
192
anyhow," rights that no one can take away.
The second foundation of the desire to speak was the belief that when
their story was told, Africans' rights would, or might, be honored. Often this
confidence was surely tempered; as Thandi Orleyn put it to me, Africans
approached the courts with hope rather than faith. Lucas Kgatitsoe, for example, was perhaps more of an activist, in my terminology, than a speaker;
he was not optimistic about winning in court, and explained that the
Magopa brought suit in part to win publicity and attention. He also said,
however, that they acted in part because "we knew that ... at the end,
188. Kgatitsoe interview, 3 Nov. 1994, transcript at 2 (cited in note 40).
189. Id Mr. Kgatitsoe commented that "we did not agree on that one."
Mr. Kgatitsoe also made a somewhat rights-oriented claim, but a more deferential one,
when he calmed another official-who had called Mr. Kgatitsoe a "kaffir" (an abusive term
for "black") and threatened to break off negotiations-by telling him: "I believe that you are
my father and ... as a father I do not believe... that it would be right for you to tell me that
you are going to... just ... shut us out because there is no other father that I can go to....
[If as a father you are going to treat me that way then I don't know that it is right for a father
to... treat his son that way." Id. at 1. Geoff Budlender, a veteran public interest lawyer in
South Africa, told me that Africans repeatedly used this appeal to whites' duties as their
"fathers" to good effect.
190. Id. at 3-4.
191. Id. at 4.
192. Id.
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justice shall be seen to be done"; "the hope was there."' 93 Other Africans,
however, seem to have had greater confidence. One lawyer told me that
one group of rural clients he represented often had more confidence that
they would get justice through the courts than he did. A unionist told me
that the union members she assisted in the Industrial Court did expect justice there; when they didn't get it, moreover, they did not accept her explanation that the true nature of the system was adverse to them but instead
suspected that in their particular case justice had been denied because of
bribery. And a community organizer who had worked with communities,
including the Magopa, in removal cases, suggested that her clients might
have felt that justice would prevail through them-a sentiment with a religious flavor-and that perhaps they felt that if they had their say in court
the judge would be convinced.
Some part of the legitimacy of the courts in the eyes of speakers may
have flowed directly from the speakers' own religious convictions, but to the
extent that the speakers saw their words as potentially persuasive the legal
system could also have earned legitimacy because it allowed those words to
be spoken-by the litigants themselves, or by their lawyers. Not always, and
not in every court: the pass courts operated in assembly-line fashion, and
many people were probably poorly heard, or not at all, in the magistrates'
courts as well.' 94 At least in the Supreme Court, however, litigants had the
opportunity to tell their story. Africans' day-to-day experiences in dealing
with white officials under apartheid were rarely pleasant;' 95 it may almost
be true, as one law teacher said to me, that the Supreme Court was the only
place in the country where blacks were treated with civility.
As we have already seen, Tom Tyler has found evidence that procedural justice is very important to judgments of legitimacy in the United
States. I encountered repeated suggestions in South Africa that the opportunity to be heard was important there as well. Thus Don Nkadimeng, though
he saw Africans as strongly critical of the courts, also commented that the
sheer fact that they had an opportunity to be heard "to many people was
sufficient to establish credibility on the part of the Supreme Court."' 96 That
the Supreme Courts provided this opportunity may reflect the conscientiousness or even the sympathies of the judges; it may also reflect the greater
public scrutiny these courts received; and it may also be attributable to the
fact that clients in the Supreme Courts were more likely to be represented,
193. Id. at 5.
194. Jotham Zwane remembered hearing a magistrate say, from the bench, "Be quiet you
kaffir!" Zwane interview, 8 Nov. 1994, tape 2 transcript at 18 (cited in note 178).
195. According to a 1985 Human Sciences Research Council report, "Africans in particular but perhaps other groups too, experience the ... actions of the officials as indicative of
the inaccessibility, lack of sympathy, etc. of the authorities and of whites." South African
Society 89 (cited in note 60).

196. Nkadimeng interview, 2 Nov. 1994, transcript at 9 (cited in note 139).
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and by the very group of lawyers-the advocates-from whose ranks the
judges themselves were drawn. 197 But, in any event, Africans' stories did get
told in the Supreme Courts-however filtered the storytelling may have
been through legal discourse-and for the people whom I have called
"speakers" this opportunity may well have been an important source of
legitimation.
C. The Activists
Just as it would be a mistake to characterize the South African legal
system as having fairly and effectively protected Africans from crime, so it
would be a mistake to say that this system strongly and consistently resisted
the injustices of apartheid. Conservative Africans may have been willing to
forgive a great deal in forming their judgments of the legal system's crimecontrol performance, and "speakers" may have been sustained by their belief
in the power of the words they were able to utter in court. "Activists," however, men and women who were vividly conscious of the injustices pervading their lives, and who saw their task more as the mobilization of pressure
against whites than as the transformation of whites' hearts, seem less likely
to have exaggerated any virtues the legal system might have. Though it is
impossible to be certain, I suspect that African "activists" have not been
among those who have affirmed confidence in the country's legal system in
polls over the years.
Nevertheless, it would also be a mistake to ignore those reslects in
which the courts, or at least some of those who judge or litigate in them,
have limited the injuries done by apartheid, and it would likewise be a mistake to assume that activists have simply ignored this aspect of the South
African legal system. I suggest, rather, that the modest achievements of the
South African legal system on this score may have helped to legitimize the
ideals of impartial adjudication and courageous protection of legal rights,
even as radical observers of this system found much reason to say that those
ideals were not being realized. Three factors, in particular, might have contributed to this result: the courts' surprisingly restrained handling of political
trials, the respect earned by anti-apartheid lawyers themselves, and the guidance of political leaders.
1. The Courts' Handling of Political Trials
Let us consider the statistics on the rates of conviction in political
trials-perhaps the cases with which activist victims of-apartheid would be
most concerned, and from which they might draw the most compelling evi197. Some of these points were made to me by Mr. Nkadimeng, id. at 9-10.
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dence for their own assessments of the courts. 198 Government statistics offer
us one picture of these results. Government statistics for 1 July 1992-30
June 1993 report convictions in 96 of the 123 prosecutions for crimes
against state security (a conviction rate of 78%), and in 8,378 (or 73%) of
the 11,442 prosecutions for crimes categorized as involving "law and order,"
at least some of which would probably have been "political" offenses. 199
These statistics suggest that the courts are refusing to convict about a fourth
of the people brought up on these serious charges. The conviction rates in
nonpolitical cases appear to be quite comparable. 200 This information might
be taken to suggest at least that the courts act with some measure of scrupulousness even in political trials.
It appears, however, that in some political cases the rates of conviction
are much lower. As compiled by the Human Rights Commission (HRC), an
independent monitoring body with no fondness for the government, the
numbers of those charged with political offenses in recent years who have
actually been convicted are set out in table 5. As this table reflects, the
conviction rate in these political cases during the years 1990-93 has never
been as high as 19%. It might be thought that these remarkably low conviction rates are simply an expression of the winds of reform sweeping through
South Africa by 1990, but this does not appear to be the case. Earlier HRC
data, though seemingly less complete, suggest that political trials generally
did not end in conviction during the years from 1986 to 1989 either-and
29
these years were the height of the state of emergency. 1
It is not clear how to explain this discrepancy. It may be that the
Human Rights Commission's conviction rates are lower because it tracked
cases from an earlier stage, while the government statistics address only
those cases which are taken to the point of actual prosecution. It may also
198. The efforts of anti-apartheid lawyers were not confined to political trials. Other
work went on in litigation challenging emergency powers, and this work ultimately was often,
though not always, unsuccessful. Still other legal challenges, however, were brought in civil
cases dealing with such issues as influx control and labor law, and in some of these fields antiapartheid lawyers won important victories that might also have attracted the attention of
activist African observers.
199. Central Statistical Service, Crimes: Prosecutions and Convictions with Regard to Certain Offences Table 2 (Prosecutions and Convictions According to Class, Subclass and Offence-7 years and older) (CSS Report No. 00-11-01 (1992/93)). I am grateful to Nico
Steytler for providing this material to me. Of the 8,378 convictions for "law and order" offenses, 7,150 are for crimes involving arms and ammunition; many or most of these offenses
may have had no political content.
200. For crimes of "personal relations," evidently including most crimes of violence, the
conviction rate was 74%; for property crimes, the rate was 78%. Id., Table 4 (Result of Prosecutions according to Class and Subclass).
201. The Human Rights Commission's figures for earlier years are less elaborate, and
perhaps less complete, but still suggest conviction rates comparable to, though not as low as,
those for 1990-93. In 1986, according to the Commission, there were 195 convictions out of
690 people accused (28.3%); in 1987, 229 of 792 (28.9%); in 1988, 255 of 574 (44.4%); and
in 1989, 493 of 3,183 (15.5%). Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Update: Review of
1989, March 1990, at 8.
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TABLE 5
Political Trial Outcomes, 1990-1993
Acquittals &
Convictions & Cases Discharged
Convictions as
Total No.
Admissions
or "Struck
Cases
% of Total
Accused
of Guilt
from the Roll" Withdrawn No. Accused
1990
1991
1992
1993

3,894
3,246
4,298
1,747

710
478
708
251

657
418
184
305

2,527
2,145
3,379
1,145

18.2'
14.7b
16.5 c
14.4d

Hansson, 1992 S. Aft. Crim. Just. at 319 (cited in note 117), citingHuman Rights Commis-

sion, 3 (11) Hum. Rrs. Rev., Dec. 1990, at 4.
b Id. citing Human Rights Commission, 4 (12) Hum. Rts. Update, Dec. 1991, at 6. In 1991,
190 persons were also granted indemnity.

' Human Rights Commission, 5 (12) Hum. Rts. Update, Dec. 1992, at 12. These figures are
for 1992 through 25 December and were subject to revision as late-arriving information came in. In
addition, 19 people were granted indemnity and 8 absconded.
d Human Rights Commission, Monthly Repression Rep.-Dec. 1993 at 4. In addition, 1 person
was granted indemnity and 21 absconded. Another Human Rights Commission publication gives a
somewhat higher number for convictions (305), but I suspect this is an accidental transposition of
the figure for acquittals. Human Rights Commission, Hum. Rts. Rev.: South Africa 1993 at 7.

be that the Human Rights Commission's classification of cases as political
intersects only quite approximately with the most "political" categories of
the government's statistics. But it seems clear, whatever the resolution of
these issues, that a very substantial number of people who at one point faced
the danger of prosecution for acts with political overtones have been able to
escape conviction. It may be, as well, that the cases which acquired the
most visibility as "political" cases-and so might have been the most likely
to be picked up by the Human Rights Commission's statistics-were nota20 2
bly unlikely to result in convictions.
As a system of political repression, in short, prosecutions in South African political trials were certainly not irresistible and may have worked decidedly poorly. Undoubtedly many of the accused in these trials were
subjected to great suffering at the hands of the police, and to prolonged
interruptions of their lives, but when they finally came to court, they could
often hope to escape conviction. If the reason that conviction was not inevitable, and perhaps unlikely, was that the courts insisted on fair procedures
202. This inference is supported by a comment of Nomazizi Mtshotshosa. She told me
that she is a board member of the South African Legal Defense and Education Fund, which
then funded defenses in political cases, and that the conviction rate in cases which they were
funding was only about 4%. Mtshotshosa interview, 7 Nov. 1994, transcript at 13 (cited in
note 30). Presumably the cases that attract such funding support are, again, among the most
visible "political" cases.
Certain "political" prosecutions, however, seem to have been very likely to produce convictions-notably, as various data suggest, those for treason and terrorism.
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and sufficient proof, then the accused in these trials-and the members of
the public who followed these events-could have come to accord a measure of recognition to these benign aspects of the courts. Since many of
these trials appear to have taken place in the magistrates' courts rather than
the Supreme Courts,20 3 moreover, even these lower courts might have garnered a modicum of respect as a resuli of these trials. (Some individual
judges on the Supreme Courts, however, would deservedly have stood out
for their vigilance in seeking to salvage as much justice from South African
law as possible.) As evidence of the problems of the people's courts accumulated, even activist Africans might have seen in that grim experience further reason to value the degree of evenhandedness the formal courts
sometimes attained.
Whether those who experienced or followed these trials attributed
their results to any qualities of the courts, however, is far from dear. While I
believe that some part of the explanation of these low conviction rates must
be found (as one South African lawyer observed to me) in the courts' refusal
to countenance intolerably low standards of proof of guilt, other factors
were surely at work as well. The state may have been unwilling to expose
some of its evidence to public view, and may have felt that it had already
exacted a form of punishment in the course of pretrial detention. Police
investigations may well have been slipshod and the evidence of guilt scanty.
Witnesses the state might have called to testify against the accused, moreover, may have refused to testify, either out of political commitment or out
of fear of later reprisal. Even to the extent that the judges were responsible
for the results, finally, observers who were conscious of other grounds for
challenging these same judges may simply have found these events unpersuasive as evidence for any claim of the judges' virtue. One black lawyer, for
example, attributed magistrates' decisions not to convict in cases where the
evidence was extremely weak not to honesty but to the desire to avoid embarrassment. 20 4 But activists had other reasons as well for recognizing the
judicial system's potential.
2. Legitimation by Association with Anti-Apartheid Lawyers
Albie Sachs has commented: "It might even be argued that the more
unfavourably Africans felt towards the laws [of South Africa], the more

203. I base this inference on a review of the data on political trials compiled by the
Human Rights Commission in late 1989; only a limited number of the many trials mentioned
in the Updates covering this period are noted as taking place in the Supreme Courts. See

Human Rights Commission, 2 (4) Hum. Rts. Update: Sept-Oct 1989, Nov. 1989; id., 2 (5)
Hum. Rts. Update: Nov-Dec 1989, Jan. 1990.
204. Tom Lediga, in Tlakula & Lediga interview, 7 Nov. 1994, transcript at 16 (cited in
note 29).
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well-disposed they were towards the lawyers. '' 20 5 Whether or not that is litemily true, it does seem likely that anti-apartheid lawyers have won the
respect of many of those they represented. Among the people accompanying
Nelson Mandela to Oslo for the Nobel Peace Prize ceremonies was a white
lawyer, George Bizos, who had been one of Mandela's lawyers when he was
sentenced to life imprisonment 30 years earlier.206 Some months earlier,
Mandela had attended the dinner honoring the retiring director of a leading
South African public interest law group, the Legal Resources Centre, and
20 7
was photographed, grinning, with the outgoing director and his successor.
After a group of prominent United Democratic Front activists were freed by
South Africa's highest court in 1989, their lawyers were applauded with the
cheer "Viva democratic lawyers viva!" I am sure that anti-apartheid lawyers
have also won respect for the day-to-day work they do on behalf of a wide
range of individual clients facing a host of problems, particularly as the advice centre movement has made it possible for a much wider range of Afri20 8
cans to obtain legal help.
These lawyers have been both prominent and obscure. No doubt they
have held views of South African law and of law in general that have
ranged from tempered faith to utter cynicism. My sense, however, is that
many of these lawyers took very seriously indeed what they saw as the highest aspirations of the legal system. Some of them, moreover, have been people who had manifestly gained the professional respect of their peers in that
system. Those who admired these lawyers may have found some ground for
admiring what these lawyers valued as well, and for admiring a profession in
which people could oppose injustice and fight against it.20 9 Perhaps they
205. Sachs, Justice in South Africa at 202 (cited in note 159).
206. Bill Keller, "2 South Africans Peer into Future," N.Y. imes, 10 Dec. 1993, at A7.
207. Arthur Chaskalson retired as national director of the Legal Resources Centre in
September 1993 and was succeeded by Geoff Budlender. Chaskalson, Mandela, and
Budlender stand side by side in a photograph published in the LRC News (Winter-Spring
1993/94). Chaskalson has since been appointed as the President of South Africa's new Constitutional Court.
208. One leader of a community represented by an anti-apartheid lawyer described that
lawyer as being "as close as our underpants"-a recognition not of impropriety but of the
lawyer's intense engagement with the people with whom he worked.
209. One veteran of a long political trial told me that many people imprisoned for political offenses studied law on Robben Island. He himself, now free, is in law school. (A lawyer
pointed out to me, though, that part of the reason for the Robben Islanders' choice of fields
may have been that for various reasons they could not get permission to study certain other
subjects.) As noted earlier, see text at note 171 supra,many who worked in advice centres as
paralegals (again, probably in part because they could not work elsewhere) were also political
activists.
Quite aside from the veterans of political trials, a considerable number of black South
Africans have chosen in the past two decades to become lawyers. This choice might be taken
as a recognition of the comparative openness of law as compared with other South African
institutions. But black lawyers often have sharply negative views of the system within which
they work, and most may well have seen their choice to practice law as, in the words of Pansy
Tlakula, a choice made "because there was nothing else." Tlakula & Lediga interview, 7 Nov.
1994, transcript at 11 (cited in note 29).
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also were moved by the contact with white lawyers who actually opposed
apartheid 210 and with black lawyers who had learned to manipulate the rulers' system. 211 Even if they also viewed their lawyers as not being part of the
existing legal system-as I was told more than once 2 12 -clients might have
found reason to admire the values that a legal system could embody in a
21 3
post-apartheid nation.
3.

Legitimation through the Efforts of African Leaders

I do not suggest that activist Africans faced with indications of judges'
care and lawyers' courage could only conclude that the South African legal
system, or even some of its asserted ideals, had earned some degree of legitimacy. For those who did not draw such conclusions spontaneously, however, there remains a significant possibility-that they might come to
accept such views to the extent that African leaders endorse them.
The values of African leaders do not control the views of their fellow
Africans, but like leaders everywhere these men and women certainly can
affect their supporters' views. As we have already seen, moreover, many
Africans-perhaps including many activists-are not well educated and do
not have detailed information about many of the issues and institutions of
South African life.2 14 African leaders are likely to have considerable ability
to sway their followers' opinions on those issues on which the man or
210. Jotham Zwane, who struggled for years against the pass law system and against
apartheid in general, finally was able to resolve his pass problems with the help of Geoff
Budlender of the Legal Resources Centre. Mr. Zwane said of his lawyer that he was "powerful
on his points," and that he was "against the apartheid. That's why.., he was powerful....
Geoff... had a green light... to say where to go with the apartheid." Interview, 8 Nov.
1994, tape 2 transcript at 16 (cited in note 178).
211. For example, an anonymous reviewer of this article emphasized the respect blacks
had for the legal work of Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo in the 1950s. Similarly, Yvonne
Mokgoro-now the first African woman to serve on South Africa's Constitutional Courtbecame a lawyer in part as a result of the inspiration of Robert Sobukwe, a lawyer who was
also a founder of the Pan Africanist Congress. After Ms. Mokgoro was arrested in a pass law
raid, Sobukwe got the charge against her dismissed. "As they were walking away from the
court, Mokgoro remarked to him that more men needed to be trained as lawyers and he
turned to her saying 'Don't let me hear you say that again. Law might seem like a maledominated profession but women can do it and we should start with you."' Alice Coetzee,
"The 'People's Judge,'" 8 (7) Democracy in Action, 15 Dec. 1994, at 7.
212. In the words of Tom Lediga, "They would even call you 'comrade."' Tlakula &
Lediga interview, 7 Nov. 1994, transcript at 17 (cited in note 29).
213. Finally, to the extent that these lawyers also succeeded in persuading or enabling
some South African judges to render decisions protecting the victims of apartheid, they may
have contributed to the degree of legitimation that the courts were earning through their
handling of such litigation. Judge Richard Goldstone, who as chair of the Goldstone Commission led important and sometimes dramatic inquiries into the sources of political violence in
South Africa, told me that one reason his commission-headed as it was by a sitting South
African judge-was able to function was that the victories won by anti-apartheid lawyers had
conferred legitimacy on the judiciary. Personal communication, 16 April 1993.
214. See text and note at note 114 supra.
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woman on the street is not well informed. Thus Mark Orkin notes "the
established finding from political sociology that voters tend to follow party
orientations on policy issues. The tendency is even stronger on issues about
which they are not very knowledgeable."' ls If, therefore, an African elite
finds some merit in the legal process in South Africa, they may be able to
communicate that view persuasively to others in their communities-as
long as they retain the support of their erstwhile followers.
This phenomenon may in fact be at work. There is some evidence
suggesting that African elites are modestly more confident in the legal system than are other, less privileged African men and women (see appendix
2). Admittedly, this does not seem to be the case for African lawyers, who
might be expected to be particularly influential with their clients on the
question of the virtues of the legal system. But there is also evidence that
members of one especially influential African elite-the political leaders
engaged in the shaping of a new constitution-entertain a measure of such
confidence. I have already mentioned the stance of Nelson Mandela, who
combines stem criticism of this system with participation in it and seemingly with respect for its better features. As we will see in a moment, moreover, during the negotiations that ended apartheid, the ANC as a whole
embraced a process whose results bespeak at least a tolerance for legalism
and a measure of confidence by the ANC in its ability to achieve power in
such a framework. Because Nelson Mandela and the ANC at this time enjoy preeminent popularity among Africans, we can infer that they will tend
to influence their many supporters to share these views-although we must
also recognize that outside the ANC, and even within it, more impatient
216
voices also enjoy an attentive audience.
If anti-apartheid lawyering has played a role in the development of this
stance among ANC negotiators, it did not engender unqualified faith. Indeed, the ANC's confidence in the legal system not long ago may have
been considerably more attenuated, to say the least, than it is today; Albie
Sachs has commented that "South Africa must be the only country in the
world in which sections of the oppressed actually constituted an anti-Bill of
215. Orkin, "Politics" at 87 (cited in note 60). Orkin also maintains that Africans' "fundamental policy orientations to economic pressures, violence, and other strategies for change
are actually largely shaped by party-political allegiance" (at 81). He notes, however, "the
considerable extent to which [African] respondents have not felt obliged to follow their leaders" on the sanctions issue, whether their leaders favored sanctions or opposed them (at
90-91; emphasis in original). See also Schlemmer, 3 (4) IndicatorSA at 5 (cited in note 104).
216. One of these voices is that of Winnie Mandela, who capitalized on her popular
following to regain "her position as president of the Women's League of the African National
Congress," a year after she lost this post following her notorious conviction "for her involvement in the 1988 kidnapping of four young [African] men." Kenneth B. Noble, "Winnie
Mandela Regains Post in Women's Group," N.Y. Times, 9 Dec. 1993, at A6. Her saga continues. Appointed as a deputy minister in South Africa's first post-apartheid cabinet, she has
recently been fired from that post. It is hard to believe that her dismissal will be the end of the
story.
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Rights committee. '217 But this confidence seems to have grown, perhaps in
part as a result of the ANC's growing connections with anti-apartheid lawyers in South Africa and with their supporters abroad. It may be, in fact,
that anti-apartheid lawyers, who won their own legitimacy in the eyes of the
system's victims by waging legal battles against it, have played a direct and
personal role in legitimizing the framework of legalism among the negotiators for the ANC. A number of lawyers themselves played central roles for
the ANC in the negotiations that led to the interim constitution now in
place, 218 and the trust they evidently enjoy can only have enhanced the
219
influence of their perspectives on law.
The suggestion that African activists might accord a measure of legitimacy to the ideals of the legal system remains speculative. But the reasoning
I have suggested Africans might engage in has, I believe, a plausible ring to
it. Africans, confronted with great injustice, would have drawn conclusions
from that. At the same time, confronted with great dangers from crime, they
had good reason to accord some respect to any institution that helped protect them, and the criminal justice system has been such an institution. In
addition, witnessing the occasional achievements of the South African legal
system, they had reason to draw conclusions from this evidence as well; we
can infer-though we do not really know-that they in fact drew, or will
come to draw, these conclusions. Moreover, this suggestion of activist legitimation helps us to understand aspects of the actual South African scene,

217. Albie Sachs, Protecting Human Rights in a New South Aftica 6 (1990).
218. Among the lawyers or legally trained activists who helped shape the ANC's positions or negotiate on its behalf (besides Nelson Mandela himself) were Kader Asmal, a legal
scholar long in exile but by then returned to the University of the Western Cape (and now a
cabinet minister); George Bizos, a leading anti-apartheid advocate; Arthur Chaskalson, another leading public interest lawyer (now President of the Constitutional Court); Nicholas
Haysom, a scholar and practitioner involved in a wide range of anti-apartheid litigation (now
counsel to President Mandela): Brigitte Mabandla, trained as a lawyer while in exile (now
Deputy Minister of Culture); Penuel Meduna, a lawyer who went into exile during the years
of apartheid (now Deputy Minister of the Interior); Abdullah Omar, a lawyer who had represented Nelson Mandela and who only a few years earlier had been a victim of emergency
powers himself (see Omar v. Minister of Law and Order, 1987 (3) SA 859 (A)) (now Minister
of Justice); Matthew Phosa, another lawyer who went into exile (now Premier of the Eastern
Cape province); Cyril Ramaphosa, a prominent union leader with law training (now the
Chair of the Constitutional Assembly); Albie Sachs, a lawyer and scholar who suffered not
only detention but also mutilation at the hands of the apartheid regime (now a judge of the
Constitutional Court); and Joe Slovo, a lawyer and long-time leader of the South African
Communist Party (Minister of Housing in the new government until his recent death). Even
this long list leaves out other distinguished lawyers who contributed to this process.
219. It is worth mentioning that although the ANC took a more moderate position in
the negotiations than one of its rivals, the Pan Africanist Congress, the latter group also has
ties to the culture of anti-apartheid lawyering. One of its senior officials, until late in 1992,
was Dikgang Moseneke, an African advocate who played an important part in the drafting of
the interim constitution and in the Independent Electoral Commission that oversaw the
April 1994 elections. In addition, distinguished anti-apartheid legal scholars contributed to
the negotiations on behalf of the liberal Democratic Party and in other roles.
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such as the course of constitutional negotiations, and the comments of Nel220
son Mandela and Tokyo Sexwale cited earlier in this essay.
A recent, remarkable example offers a further tantalizing hint that indeed some African observers, some of the time, have found something to
respect in the administration of justice in South Africa. This example
comes from the trial of the alleged killers of Amy Biehl, a white American
woman who during her time in South Africa had reportedly worked closely
with the ANC, but was brutally killed by black youths who did not know
her but saw her as a "settler." As this trial progressed, supporters of the
ANC and of its rival, the Pan Africanist Congress, "jogged in competing
toyi-toyis, in solidarity with their comrades inside the court. For the ANC
supporters, it must have felt strange to support proceedings in a court forming part of a judicial system long seen to mete out white man's justice." As
for the PAC supporters, "it's clear few expect justice from a court commanded by 'settlers.' "221 The ANC supporters, mobilized in support of the
South African legal system, apparently have taken what might be called an
activist stance in favor of the system's partial legitimacy.
At the same time, it may well be that those who were influenced by
this activist perspective on legitimation never expressed that acceptance in
affirmations of confidence in the South African legal system as it stood
under apartheid, and so are not part of the explanation for the expressions

of confidence in the legal system in the opinion polls on which this article
focused earlier. Instead, what is being legitimized here may be the ideal of
the rule of law rather than the very flawed approximation of that ideal that
has held sway in South Africa until now. I do not at all suggest that Africans draw their views on law as an institution solely from their observation
of the functioning of the institutions fashioned by the white rulers of South
Africa, for Africans have their own traditions of law to consult as well. But
the evidence that the legal system under apartheid could generate results
that did not serve apartheid's interests, as well as the evidence that men and
women devoted to the law could also be profoundly committed to the struggle against apartheid, could well have played a part in Africans' judgments
about law's potential, and so in the legitimation not of the existing legal
system but of the value of the rule of law in a future South Africa.
D. The Impact of Anti-Apartheid Lawyering on Africans'
Legitimation of the Legal System
Although the three paradigms of African thought that I have just
sketched are quite different, I believe that anti-apartheid lawyering may
220. See text and notes at notes 35-39 supra.
221. Gaye Davis, "Warring Camps in the Biehl Trial Corridors," Weekly Mail & Guardian, 26 Nov.-2 Dec. 1993, at 9.
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have contributed to the process of legitimation within each of these perspectives. The nature of that contribution, however, may well have varied
from paradigm to paradigm. Here let us recapitulate what we have learned
as it sheds light on the particular impact of anti-apartheid lawyering.
The effect of anti-apartheid lawyering on conservative Africans seems
likely to have been the most ambiguous. For people primarily concerned
with issues of order and crime control, anti-apartheid lawyers' work may
have attracted attention only when these lawyers defended people accused
of crimes committed for political reasons. In defending such people, antiapartheid lawyers may have actually frustrated some conservative Africans'
desire for effective crime control-or, by playing their part in the process of
criminal adjudication, they may have reinforced these observers' confidence
in the courts.
But not all conservatives were exclusively focused on crime. Many,
perhaps most, also were concerned, albeit in a cautious and restrained way,
with improving their lot under apartheid, and on this score the legitimizing
impact of anti-apartheid lawyering may have been more clear-cut. By helping to establish the array of advice centres around the country and by providing legal help'to a great many black South Africans through them, antiapartheid lawyers (and paralegals) may well have enhanced popular, conservative views of the legal system. More generally, lawyers who were able
to make the system work on behalf of black people may have helped conservative Africans, disposed as they were to moderate assessments of the
system under which they lived, to see virtues in the legal system. Finally, to
whatever extent the heritage of racial subordination affected the thinking
of some conservatives, it seems possible that contact with those antiapartheid lawyers who were white contributed to their willingness to see
virtue in white institutions.
For the speakers and the activists, the impact of anti-apartheid lawyering seems likely to have been more unambiguously legitimizing. Such lawyers enabled the speakers to tell their stories or told them on their clients'
behalf.222 They helped win victories, on behalf of speakers and activists (and
conservatives). The lawyers who won these victories or fought against the
many defeats that also took place deserved the trust they sometimes, perhaps commonly, won from their clients as a result. And among the closest
observers of their work would have been the African political leadership,
222. Certainly lawyers who were poor storytellers or who made their clients feel that
their own stories were being unjustifiably silenced would not have won applause. My sense,
however, is that South African clients, even activist ones, tended to take lawyers' advice very
seriously; for example, I was told more than once that accused activists who had intended to
refuse to participate in their trials had been persuaded by their lawyers not to take that course.
E.g., Mtshotshosa interview, 7 Nov. 1994, transcript at 12 (cited in note 30). I suspect that
clients also often recognized that even relatively bleak outcomes were better than what might
have ensued without a lawyer's assistance.
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many of whom were themselves clients and all of whom were likely to be
affected by the outcomes of these lawyers' efforts. The upshot is that it
seems likely that the efforts of anti-apartheid lawyers have in fact played a
part in winning the South African legal system, or at least the ideals toward
which the legal system at its best aspired, a measure of respect among African speakers and activists.
In short, anti-apartheid lawyering probably did contribute to the legitimation of the South African legal system or, more precisely, to the measure
of legitimation that that system and its ideals appear to have enjoyed.

Il. WAS THE PARTIAL LEGITIMATION OF THE
LEGAL SYSTEM DESIRABLE?
If the South African legal system enjoyed a measure of legitimacy
among Africans, and if, in particular, legal ideals enjoyed a measure of legitimacy among African activists and political leaders, then we would expect
to see in the design of the new South Africa evidence that Africans, or at
least their leaders, see law as a central protection against injustice, even the
injustice that they themselves might do. This is in fact what we do see when
we look at the elaborate interim constitution that has now been adopted to
govern South Africa. The evidence is not unambiguous, for the transitional
agreements which the ANC endorsed are the product of compromise rather
than a simple expression of the ANC's preferences. 223 Moreover, they are
the product of a process in which lawyers-whose disposition toward legal
arrangements may not have been shared by those they represented-played
a major role. In addition, some important elements of the compromise entail significant modifications of the power of the current South African judiciary. But it is hard to read this constitution without inferring that those
who agreed on it, including the ANC, must have had a sense that the existing judiciary can be drawn on, or guided, so as to play a useful part in a
new South Africa.
To see the working of legal ideals more precisely, let us look closely at
the interim constitution. Even physically this document bespeaks its lawyerly roots-its more than 220 pages (including both English and Afrikaans
texts), over 250 sections and countless subsections attest to the close attention to legal detail that informed its drafting.2 24 The interim constitution
continues the present judiciary in place,22 5 a step that might be taken to
223. Howard Venable emphasized this point to me.
224. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (Act No. 200 of 1993) ("1993
Constitution"). For a more detailed analysis of this constitution, see Stephen Ellmann, "The
New South African Constitution and Ethnic Division," 26 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 5
(1994).
225. 1993 Constitution § 241.
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reflect a modicum of faith in the legal system-except that the present civil
service is also continued in place, 226 and it may be widely reviled by South
African blacks.
Perhaps more significantly, the principal changes made in the judicial
system are changes that enhance the role of the courts as guarantors of liberty. First, to provide greater assurance of the judges' impartiality, the interim constitution changes the system of appointments of high court judges,
22 7
whose selection had been in' the hands of the government of the day.
Second, the interim constitution gives South Africa, for the first time, a
judicially enforceable set of constitutional liberties and thereby abrogates
the longstanding tradition of Parliamentary supremacy. 228 Third, the interim constitution creates a new Constitutional Court to take primary responsibility for construing the Constitution; this step does suggest a lack of
complete faith in the existing judiciary, but it hardly reflects a lack of faith
in adjudication. 229 Fourth, this constitution gives the Constitutional Court
a remarkable role in the process of adopting the new constitution which will
govern South Africa when the interim constitution is superseded. The Constitutional Court's role in this respect is to determine whether the constitutional text that the new Parliament develops in its capacity as a
Constitutional Assembly is in compliance with a set of 34 constitutional
principles included in the interim constitution. Without the Constitutional
Court's approval, a proposed constitution will not be able to take effect.230
The faith this proposal puts in the fidelity of judges suggests that the negotiators of the interim constitution were decidedly hopeful about the efficacy
23
and reality of the rule of law. '
226. Id. § 236.
227. Until the new constitution, appointments to the Supreme Courts had been made
by the government in office, albeit subject to the constraint that such appointments as a
matter of practice were almost always made from the ranks of the elite of the private bar, the
"senior counsel." Though some of these appointments were painfully political, it is a fact that
the National Party government appointed a number of judges who proved to be decidedly
unsympathetic interpreters of apartheid laws. See Ellmann, Tne of Trouble 227-29 (cited in
note 2).
Under § 104(1) of the 1993 Constitution, Supreme Court judges will now be "appointed
by the President acting on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission." The members of
this commission, in turn, include presidential appointees but also individuals designated by
the legal profession, by the deans of the nation's law faculties, and by the upper house of the
national legislature, as well as three sitting judges. Id. § 105.
228. Id. §§ 7-35.
229. Id. § 98. The system of appointments to this Court was a matter of great controversy in the final stages of constitutional negotiations. The system on which the government
and the ANC had agreed would have placed these appointments largely under political, and
in particular presidential, control; as a result of opposition from the Democratic Party (and
perhaps from others), the system ultimately agreed on gives the sitting Chief Justice and the
Judicial Service Commission, among others, some capacity to constrain the president's selections. Id. § 99.
230. Id. §§ 71, 74.
231. For another striking indication of the new leaders' adoption of the old legal system,
consider the example of Abdullah Omar. Omar, a former political prisoner (see note 218
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The heritage of anti-apartheid lawyering may also affect the extent to
which this constitution is honored. It is of course true that this elaborate
legal apparatus will come to naught if the people of the country show no
disposition to abide by it. South Africa faces real risks of just such a collapse
into disorder, civil war, or dictatorship. But these grim possibilities do not
make the constitution irrelevant; rather, they confirm the importance of
the nurturance of a political culture that values adherence to the constitution .3 2 In the building of that culture, the efforts of anti-apartheid lawyers
and the decisions of those judges who found their arguments persuasive may
offer confirmation of the value of shaping a legal order that is not simply a
tool of the rulers of the day. This history may also help to certify the bona
fides of those public interest lawyers who are already embarked on refocusing their anti-apartheid lawyering to the preservation of rights under a democratically elected government. 233 The legal challenges to apartheid may
have helped to build a post-apartheid legal culture already in South Africa's
former colony, the new nation of Namibia;234 we can hope that it will have
that effect in South Africa as well.
All these events might be just as I have described or anticipated them,
and yet it might be answered that the impact of the legitimation of the
South African legal system was negative rather than positive. This answer
might recast the old fear that anti-apartheid lawyering directly legitimized
the system of apartheid into a concern that the more limited legitimation of
the legal system and of the ideal of the rule of law had enabled the South
African government to preserve white privileges under the new constitution. It is true that the interim constitution preserves a considerable measupra), is now South Africa's Minister of Justice. In 1990, he commented that when antiapartheid lawyers go to court "lilt is not a question of using South African laws. It is a question of defending people against the laws.... But you must go to court to fight injustice even
though the laws are weighted against you." "What Does Mandela Want?" Hum. Rts., Fall/
Winter 1990, at 31, 46 ("Interview with Abdullah Omar by Vicki Quade"). Late in 1994, he
told a forum that the "South African court system did not require a major review although
representation needed to be addressed." "South African Court System Does Not Require Major Review," This Week in South Africa: News Highlights from the South African Media (S. Aft.
Consulate Gen., New York, N.Y.), 8-14 Nov. 1994, at 4. (The quoted words are from This
Week in South Africa and not, directly, from Minister Omar.)
232. See Davis, 18 Soc. Just. at 70, 78 (cited in note 92).
233. See Arthur Chaskalson, "The LRC in the Future," in Legal Resources Trust/Legal
Resources Centre, Report for the Year Ended 31 March 1993 at 10, 12-14.
234. David Smuts, the founder of Namibia's Legal Assistance Centre, a public interest
law group that began operations before independence and has continued them since, has said
that he thinks that his Centre's "focussing on those kinds of [human rights] issues at that time
[before independence], and empowering people in a way to actually understand what was
going on in human rights cases, and to really get them informed and to try to provide redress"
was "a very important achievement for the Centre, and in basically helping further the whole
idea of the creation of a human rights culture." Interview with David Smuts by Jonathan
Klaaren, May 1991, at 49. For the suggestion that the new Namibian constitution may, however, rely too much on judicial protection of rights against the state, see Nico Steytler, "The
Judicialization of Namibian Politics," 9 S.Afr. J.Hum. Rts. 477 (1993).
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sure of white privilege, though it is also true that it enables the new
government to embark on a considerable measure of reform and redistribution.235 I doubt, however, that the source of these results is primarily the
negotiators' acceptance of legal values. Though we should not ignore the
impact of intellectual perspectives on practical results, we are likely to be on
sounder ground if we understand the outcome of South Africa's negotiations
in this regard as first and foremost the outcome of a political struggle.
Let me take just one example to illustrate this point. The right to property, a matter of great concern to whites, receives considerable protection in
the new constitution. Though there are constitutions which meaningfully
protect human rights but omit explicit protection of property, and some
South Africans may have looked to such documents as models, 236 it may be
that the negotiators' embrace of "rights talk" tended to push them to talk
about property rights as well as other rights. But it is very hard to believe
that South African whites, for whom economic privilege is likely to be their
principal remaining power in a new South Africa, would have foregone protection of their property rights if rights talk had somehow been forgotten.
Finally, the legitimation of the idea of the rule of law might be attacked not on the ground that it insulated particular rights or claims but on
the ground that reliance on formal rules and judicially protected rights ultimately disserves the goals of human liberty and community. This challenge
is akin to some "critical" attacks on rights in the United States. Some Critical Race scholars here have responded by arguing that the ideology of rights,
despite its underlying problems, has in fact promoted the liberty of oppressed groups in this country.2 37 South African experience similarly reminds us that a critique of rights talk is only plausible in a country that has
actually succeeded in protecting some rights. South Africans, black and
white but especially black, have suffered greatly for their country's lack of
an apparatus of entrenched human rights protected by independent courts,
as imperfect as any such apparatus will always be. To the extent that antiapartheid lawyering has contributed to teaching those who are shaping the
new South Africa the value of such an apparatus, I believe it has served
South Africa well.

235. See Ellmann, 26 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. at 34-40 (cited in note 224).
236. See Matthew Chaskalson, "The Problem with Property: Thoughts on the Constitutional Protection of Property in the United States and the Commonwealth," 9 S. Aft. J.
Hum. Rts. 388, 408-11 (1993).
237. See Patricia J. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights: Diary of a Law Professor
146-65 (1991); Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, "Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law," 101 Hav.L. Rev. 1331, 1356-69,
1381-87 (1988); Richard Delgado, "The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have
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APPENDIX 1
Coloured, Asian, and White Confidence in the Legal System,
1993 (Percentages)

A great deal
Quite a lot
Not very much
None at all
Do not know

Coloureds

Asians

Whites

10.7
26.5
45.8
9.3
7.7

6.8
283
49.2
10.9
4.8

20.5
31.6
28.8
9.6a
9.4

SouRm "Markinor 1993 Statistics" at 20, Table 7/3 (Aug. 1993) (Coloureds and Asians); at
19, Table 10/3 (June 1993) (whites) (cited in note 57).
Includes refusals to answer.

APPENDIX 2
African Confidence in the Legal System, Education, and
Income
The data on education, income, and confidence in the legal system
suggest some patterns. In both 1990 and 1993, urban Africans who were
better off were relatively more likely to express confidence in the legal system than most of their lower-income counterparts. In addition, in 1990 and
1993-but not in 1981-the least and most educated urban Africans were
more likely to express confidence in the legal system than those with intermediate levels of education. The impact of education seems to be more
ambiguous than the impact of higher income, perhaps because of a tendency
among some people with higher education to be more, rather than less,
discontented with their lot. In any event, it does appear from these surveys
(though the data are hardly conclusive) that the African urban elite includes a substantial number of people who are disposed by income and/or by
education to be modestly more confident in the legal system than are their
less privileged fellow citizens. The relevant data, drawn from "Markinor
1981 Statistics" at 46 (cited in note 55); "Markinor 1990 Statistics" at 171
(cited in note 56); and "Markinor 1993 Statistics" at 20 (cited in note 57),
are shown in the following tabulations:
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A. Mean Levels of Confidence in the Legal System, by Education

2.51
Low education
Medium education 2.60
2.39
High education

1993c

1990,

19812

None/some primary
education
Primary complete
Some high [school]
High [school] complete
plus

2.89
2.79
2.81
2.90

Up to standard 5 2.21
Some high school 1.95
Standard 10 plus 2.11

a Only the gap between those with low and medium education is within the poll's standard
errors.
b None of the gaps between these subgroups exceeds the poll's standard errors.
o The gaps between the middle group and each of the others exceed the poll's standard errors.

B. Mean Levels of Confidence in the Legal System, by Incomea
19 9 0 b

R 699 [699 rands] or less 2.74
2.83
R 700-1,199
2.95
R 1,200 plus

1993c
R 699 or less
R 700-999
R 1,000-1,999
R 2,000-2,499
R 2,500 plus

2.11
2.01
2.02
2.18
2.18

I do not have data broken down by income for 1981.

b Only the gap between the highest and lowest groups exceeds the poll's standard errors.

c The gaps between the two highest groups and the next two groups exceed the poll's standard
errors.

Among rural Africans, no such pattern exists-at least in the 1990
data which I have. All groups' confidence in the legal system is quite similar. Better-educated and better-off rural Africans, however, express less confidence in the police than do those with less education or lower incomes,
and these gaps exceed the poll's standard errors. There are some hints that
advantages of education and income tend to produce lower confidence in
Parliament as well, though the figures here are hardly clear-cut. "Markinor
1990 Statistics" at 163, 166-67 (cited in note 56).
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